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INTEGER PROGRAMMING APPROACHES TO STOCHASTIC GAMES
ARISING IN PAIRED KIDNEY EXCHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION
Amin Dehghanian, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
We investigate three different problems in this dissertation. The first two problems are related
to games arising in paired kidney exchange, and the third is rooted in a computational branch
of the industrial organization literature. We provide more details on these problems in the
following.
End-stage renal disease (ESRD), the final stage of chronic kidney disease, is the ninth-
leading cause of death in the United States, where it afflicts more than a half million patients,
and costs more than forty billion dollars indirect expenses annually. Transplantation is the
preferred treatment for ESRD; unfortunately, there is a severe shortage of transplantable
kidneys. Kidney exchange is a growing approach to alleviate the shortage of kidneys for
transplantation, and the United States is considering creating a national kidney exchange
program since such a program provides more and better transplants. A major challenge to
establish a national kidney exchange program is the lack of incentives for transplant centers
to participate in such a program. To overcome this issue, the kidney transplant community
has recently proposed a payment strategy framework that incentivizes transplant centers to
participate in a national program. Absent from this debate is a careful investigation of how to
design these incentives. We develop a principal-agent model to analyze these incentives and
find an equilibrium payment strategy. We develop a mixed-integer bilinear bilevel program
to compute an equilibrium payment strategy. We show that this bilevel program can be
solved as a mixed-integer linear program. We calibrate our model and provide several data-
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driven insights about advantages of a national kidney exchange program. We shed light on
several controversial policy questions about an equilibrium payment strategy. In particular,
we demonstrate that there exists a “win-win” payment strategy that could result in saving
thousands of lives and billions of dollars annually.
Consensus stopping games are a class of stochastic games that arises in the context of
kidney exchange. Specifically, the problem of finding a socially optimal pure stationary
equilibrium of a consensus stopping game is adapted to value a given kidney exchange.
However, computational difficulties have limited its applicability. We show that a consensus
stopping game may have many pure stationary equilibria, which in turn raises the question
of equilibrium selection. Given an objective criterion, we study the problem of finding a best
pure stationary equilibrium for the game, which we show to be NP-hard. We characterize
the pure stationary equilibria, show that they form an independence system, and develop
several families of valid inequalities. We then solve the equilibrium selection problem as a
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) by a branch-and-cut approach. Our computational
results demonstrate the advantages of our approach over a commercial solver.
Industrial organization is an area of economics that studies firms and markets. Currently,
a class of stochastic games are adopted to model behaviors of firms in a market. However,
inherent challenges in computability of stationary equilibria have restricted its applicability.
To overcome this challenge, we develop several characterizations of stationary equilibria for
the class of stochastic games.
Keywords: Kidney exchange, standard acquisition charge, pricing, bilevel programming,
principal-agent models, stochastic stopping games, equilibrium selection, consensus decision-
making, veto players, independence system, branch-and-cut, industrial organization.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
This thesis primarily investigates topics arising in paired kidney exchange. In the first
topic, we develop an equilibrium payment strategy that incentivizes transplant centers to
participate in a national kidney exchange program. In the second topic, we develop a novel
approach to solve the problem of finding a socially optimal pure stationary equilibrium
of a class of stochastic games arising in contexts such as kidney exchange. In the third
topic, we provide several characterizations of stationary equilibria of an important class of
stochastic games from the industrial organization literature. Such characterizations facilitate
computing stationary equilibria of this class of stochastic games. We provide a brief review
of contents of this thesis, in the following.
Chapter 2: An Optimal Incentive Alignment for a National Kidney Exchange
Program. Living-donor transplantation is the preferred treatment for chronic kidney dis-
ease, the ninth-leading cause of death in the United States. A significant drawback of
living-donors is that at least one-third of the patients with a willing living-donor are unable
to receive the donor’s kidney due to biological incompatibilities. To mitigate this barrier, an
emerging clinical practice is paired kidney exchange (PKE), in which incompatible patient-
donor pairs exchange donors’ kidneys with other pairs in a biologically compatible manner.
PKE is currently utilized in a decentralized setting in the United States, which leads to inef-
ficiencies. In fact, each transplant center (a consortium of a few transplant centers) manages
a pool of its own incompatible patient-donor pairs, and conducts its exchanges internally.
To achieve the benefits of resource pooling and enhance PKE efficiency, the United States
is moving toward a national PKE program in which all patient-donor pairs are enrolled and
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arranged for PKE. However, each transplant center will participate in a national PKE pro-
gram only if such an action is in its own best interest. Hence, there is a need for a payment
strategy in which each transplant center receives a monetary reward in return for enrolling
each patient-donor. The clinical community believes that a successful national payment
strategy can lead to saving thousands of lives and millions of dollars annually. We present
a principal-agent model to capture the interaction between a national PKE program and
transplant centers through a payment strategy. We next develop a bilevel program to find
an equilibrium payment strategy of the interaction between the national PKE program and
the transplant centers. We calibrate our model using a data set provided by the United Net-
work for Organ Sharing, which leads to data-driven insights about advantages of a national
PKE program. We shed light on several controversial policy questions about an equilibrium
payment strategy. In particular, we demonstrate that there exists a “win-win” equilibrium
payment strategy that leads to saving thousands of lives and billions of dollars annually.
Chapter 3: Optimizing over Pure Stationary Equilibria in Consensus Stop-
ping Games. Developing an accurate method to value a given PKE highly improves PKE
efficacy. A recent approach to value a given PKE is based on finding a socially optimal pure
stationary equilibrium for consensus stopping games, a class of stochastic games that require
the consent of all players to terminate and arise in many practical decision-making environ-
ments with veto players. However, technical difficulties have restricted the applicability of
this approach. Motivated by this challenge, we consider the problem of finding a socially
optimal pure stationary equilibrium for consensus stopping games. We represent the prob-
lem as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP), and establish its computational complexity.
We characterize several combinatorial structures of the equilibria, and subsequently develop
various families of valid inequalities that are used to efficiently solve the MILP by a branch-
and-cut approach. Our extensive computational experiments on a set of real-world instances
demonstrate that our approach can solve some instances in minutes whereas CPLEX cannot
solve even their linear programming relaxations within several hours.
We are the first to provide combinatorial characterizations of stationary equilibria for a
class of stochastic games. This dissertation is the first attempt to develop a novel cutting
plane approach for the problem of finding a socially optimal (pure) stationary equilibrium.
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Chapter 4: Characterizing Entry and Exit for Stationary Equilibria of a Dy-
namic Oligopoly Model. We consider a dynamic industry, from industrial organization
literature, composed of two classes of firms: (i) incumbent firms, and (ii) potential entrants.
In each period, each incumbent needs to decide whether to remain in or exit from the in-
dustry. If it remains, it next decides how much to invest in this period. Otherwise, it exits,
and receives a certain salvage value. In each period, each potential entrant needs to decide
whether to enter or stay out. If it enters, it incurs a certain setup cost, and next decides
how much to invest. If it stays out, it permanently disappears from the industry. The cur-
rent status of the industry is represented by a state variable, which evolves according to a
Markovian transition conditioned on the strategies of all firms. The described industry is at
the heart of a growing literature on industrial organization. We characterize entry and exit
behaviors of the firms in stationary equilibria of the industry. Such characterizations can
facilitate the process of computing stationary equilibria.
3
2.0 AN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT FOR A NATIONAL
KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAM
2.1 INTRODUCTION
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) leads to permanent failure of both kidneys. As of December
31, 2012, at least 636,905 Americans were suffering from ESRD, and its prevalence rate is
still growing. ESRD expenditures exceeded $40 billion in 2012, and Medicare’s portion was
$28.6 billion (United States Renal Data System 2015). Two available treatment modalities
for ESRD are dialysis and transplantation. Dialysis is a temporary, expensive, and dangerous
modality, and diminishes patients’ quality of life. Kidney transplantation leads to better
patient outcomes and is less expensive than dialysis (Laupacis et al. 1996); hence, it is
the preferred choice of treatment for ESRD. Based on viability status, kidney donors are
classified into two groups: deceased-donors and living-donors. Living-donor transplants
generally provide better long-term survivals than those from deceased-donors. In the sequel,
we restrict our attention to living-donor transplants, and call a living-donor her and an
ESRD patient him.
A difficulty to greater use of living-donors is that at least one-third of ESRD patients
with willing living-donors are physiologically incompatible with their intended donors due to
blood-type and/or tissue-type incompatibilities (Montgomery et al. 2005a). To alleviate this
difficulty, an emerging clinical practice is paired kidney exchange (PKE), in which incom-
patible patient-donor pairs swap their donors in a cyclical and physiologically compatible
manner (see Figure 1). Note that the size of a PKE cycle can conceptually be any integer
greater than or equal to two; however, logistical constraints restrict it to no more than three
in effect. Currently, each patient-donor pair visits a transplant center to find out whether
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they are compatible. If they are compatible, a transplant surgery is conducted in which
the patient receives a kidney from his intended donor. Otherwise, if they are incompatible,
the transplant center seeks to arrange PKE among its incompatible patient-donor pairs.
For convenience, we refer to an incompatible patient-donor pair as a patient-donor (pair)
throughout this chapter, unless otherwise stated.
To achieve the benefits of resource pooling and enhance PKE efficiency, the United States
is moving toward the creation of a national PKE program in which all patient-donor pairs
are registered, and PKE can be arranged through this program. Indeed, as the number of
patient-donor pairs registered in a PKE program increases, both the number of transplants
and their quality increase (Roth et al. 2004, Segev et al. 2005). In particular, a national PKE
program could save at least 1000 additional lives and lead to an annual saving of $200-$500
million for the United States’ healthcare system (Segev et al. 2005, Rees et al. 2012).
A major challenge that has hindered the establishment of a national PKE program is
a lack of incentives for transplant centers to participate. One possible approach is to ask
patient-donor pairs to directly register in the national PKE program and omit the transplant
center as an intermediary in the registration process. Another is to require that the transplant
centers enroll all their patient-donor pairs in the national PKE program, by passing a law.
Ashlagi and Roth (2014) discussed these suggestions and provided reasons as to why they
are unrealistic. In Section 2.6, our numerical results demonstrate that it is unnecessary to
enforce transplant centers to participate in the national PKE program. In fact, we show that
transplant centers should be willing to pay for enrolling most of their patient-donor pairs
in the national PKE program. In the following, we clarify why transplant centers may lack
incentives to participate in a national PKE program.
In a PKE program, patient-donor pairs undergo the following stages: (1) Patient-donor
pairs are evaluated to acquire the necessary medical information including compatibility
information needed for the next stage. (2) A matching algorithm finds an assignment of
donors to recipients subject to compatibility of donors with recipients (cf. Awasthi and
Sandholm 2009, Ünver 2010, Glorie et al. 2014). (3) Recipients and donors undergo final tests
and subsequently transplant surgeries. From a financial standpoint, the insurance company










Figure 1: A four-way PKE, where each node represents a patient-donor pair. The donor in
each node donates her kidney to the patient in the next node of the cycle.
and the insurance company of a donor does not pay for her medical expenses. Donor’s pre-
match expenses are incurred before the identity of her recipient is known, so it is unclear
who pays for those expenses. This is a pressing question that needs to be addressed before
initiating a national PKE program. Deceased donor kidney transplant was suffering from
the same challenge in 1970s until the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services developed
a reimbursement strategy using the concept of a standard acquisition charge (SAC) to pay
organ procurement organizations (OPOs) for the overhead costs of evaluating and recovering
a deceased donor organ. Analogously, the development of a SAC model for a national PKE
program has been recommended so that the issue of pre-match expenses is resolved (Rees
et al. 2012, Melcher et al. 2013). This means that a national PKE program needs a payment
strategy for the pre-match expenses that is individually rational for each transplant center,
i.e., each transplant center is better off to harvest patient-donor pairs rather than do nothing
at all.
As each transplant center participating in a national PKE program seeks to maximize
its benefit, it may decide to only register its hard-to-match pairs in the pool and internally
conduct exchanges on its easy-to-match pairs. Such an approach can save the transplant
center some overhead cost related to logistics, coordination, and bureaucracy (cf. Ashlagi
and Roth 2012). Hence, transplant centers may only send their hard-to-match patient-donor
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pairs to the national PKE program. Ashlagi and Roth (2014) discussed how transplant
centers may interact with a centralized PKE program and how free riding by transplant
centers has already been observed as they withhold some of their patient-donor pairs. This
implies that the aforementioned payment strategy for a national PKE program needs to be
incentive compatible for each transplant center, i.e., each transplant center seeks to maximize
its benefit, given the payment strategy of the national PKE program.
In this chapter, we develop a payment strategy for a national PKE program that is both
individually rational and incentive compatible for transplant centers, and maximizes a social
welfare objective.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Incentives of transplant centers to participate in a national PKE program have been investi-
gated in several papers. Glorie et al. (2014) developed an algorithm to match patient-donor
pairs with multiple criteria. Their approach included individual rationality of transplant
centers by ensuring that each participating transplant center receives at least as many trans-
plants as those without participation. Ashlagi et al. (2013) studied mechanisms for two-way
exchanges under which full participation is a dominant strategy for transplant centers. They
also established lower bounds on social welfare loss of pursuing such mechanisms. Ashlagi
and Roth (2014) showed that as the number of patient-donor pairs and transplant centers
grows, it becomes less costly for society to incorporate individual rationality of transplant
centers. In addition, they proposed a bonus mechanism to incentivize transplant centers
to enroll all their patient-donor pairs in a large PKE program. Toulis and Parkes (2015)
designed a mechanism under which the truthful reporting of patient-donor pairs is efficient
and incentive compatible for each transplant center. Their analysis relies on the assumption
that the size of each transplant center’s pool is at least moderate (greater than 30). Finally,
they compared the performance of their mechanism with that of Ashlagi and Roth (2014)
by simulation.
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What distinguishes our work from the literature is that we are the first to investigate
the problem of finding an equilibrium payment strategy that incentivizes transplant centers
to participate in a national PKE program. Moreover, we present monetary definitions of
individual rationality and incentive compatibility since defining them only in terms of the
number of transplants is inaccurate.
2.3 A PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
In this section, we formally define our problem and develop a mathematical model to explore
a class of payment strategies for the national PKE program, in which each transplant center
receives a monetary reward in return for harvesting, preparing, and enrolling each patient-
donor pair in the national pool. Consistent with current practice for deceased donors and
Rees et al. (2012), we call such a reward a SAC. We use the term society to refer to the
national PKE program manager throughout the chapter. We approach the problem as a
principal-agent model in which society is the principal and transplant centers are agents.
The parameters of the model are as follows:
• I = {1, 2, . . . , I}: The set of patient-donor and altruistic donor classes.
• E := {(i, j) ∈ I 2| donors of class i are compatible with patients of class j}.
• For all i ∈ I , Ei. = {j ∈ I |(i, j) ∈ E }, i.e., set of patient-donor pair classes whose
patients are compatible with donors of class i.
• For all i ∈ I , E.i = {j ∈ I |(j, i) ∈ E }, i.e., set of patient-donor pair classes whose
donors are compatible with patients of class i.
• C = {1, 2, . . . , C}: Set of transplant centers.
• λic: Arrival rate of patient-donor pairs of class i ∈ I to transplant center c ∈ C .
• αi: Rate of patient-donor pairs of class i ∈ I which are already available in the national
pool. These pairs reflect the unmatched pairs left from earlier periods.
Note that we develop a static model for the problem of assigning the SAC compensations,
⟨sic⟩i∈I ,c∈C , since when the SAC compensations are assigned in a practical setting, they
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will remain unchanged for a long time. Hence, it is plausible to investigate patient-donor
pairs’ arrival process only through its expected value (assuming a stationary distribution).
For this reason, we incorporated the rates λic and αi for each i ∈ I and c ∈ C .
• pic: The probability that a pair of class i ∈ I belonging to transplant center c ∈ C
will be matched if it is enrolled in the national pool. We assume that this parameter is
exogenous. This assumption is plausible since the national pool is much larger than that
of a transplant center, and in principle it is not influenced by decisions of a transplant
center.
• ric: Monetary reward that transplant center c ∈ C receives in return for conducting a
transplant operation on the patient of a pair of class i ∈ I in its facilities. The amount
of money, which is reimbursed by the insurance company of a matched patient, may be
embedded in this reward. When we define our objective function subsequently, regard-
less of whether a patient is internally matched by a transplant center or is externally
matched by the national program, we consider that the patient of each pair harvested
by a transplant center has his surgery in the same center, and the donor always travels
to her intended recipient’s transplant center.
• dic: Monetary cost of harvesting a patient-donor pair and donor’s pre-match cost.
• Ri: Societal reward for matching a patient of class i ∈ I . Similar to ric, the amount
of money, which is reimbursed by the insurance company of a matched patient, may be
embedded into this reward.
Societal decision variables are as follows:
• yij: The number of donors of class i matched to patients of class j in the national pool
for all (i, j) ∈ E .
• sic: The SAC compensation for each pair of class i ∈ I enrolled in the national pool by
transplant center c ∈ C . This can be interpreted as the compensation that a transplant
center receives in return for the service that the center provides for the national PKE
program. This service includes harvesting, preparing, and enrolling a patient-donor of
class i ∈ I in the national program. Another approach is to assume that the SAC com-
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pensation depends both on the class of the enrolled patient-donor pair and the transplant
center harvesting the patient-donor pair. We investigate this question in Section 3.8.
Decision variables for each transplant center c ∈ C are as follows:
• xijc: The number of donors of class i matched to patients of class j in the pool of
transplant center c ∈ C for all (i, j) ∈ E .
• zic: Rate of patient-donors of class i ∈ I from transplant center c ∈ C enrolled in the
national pool.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the rewards ric and Ri are nonnegative for
each i ∈ I and c ∈ C , otherwise all associated decision variables will take the optimal value
0 in the subsequent optimization models and may be omitted. We also follow the convention
that a term in bold refers to a real-valued vector, e.g., xc := ⟨xijc⟩(i,j)∈E , y := ⟨yij⟩(i,j)∈E ,
zc := ⟨zic⟩i∈I , and s := ⟨sic⟩i∈I ,c∈C . For each s ∈ R|I ||C |, transplant center c ∈ C seeks to
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xijc ∈ Z+ ∀(i, j) ∈ E . (2.1e)
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λicdic ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C , (2.2d)
⟨xc, zc⟩ ∈ Ψc(s) ∀c ∈ C , (2.2e)
yij ∈ Z+ ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (2.2f)
sic unrestricted ∀i ∈ I . (2.2g)
The objective function (2.2a) represents the total reward of society due to the number of
transplants, subtracted from the amount of money that society spends on the participation
of the transplant centers. This objective function reflects the fact that it does not matter
whether a pair is matched internally by a transplant center or by the national PKE program,
provided that the sizes of both matching are the same. Conditions (2.2b) are flow conser-
vation constraints, enforcing that the rate of matched pairs of class i ∈ I does not exceed
the arrival rate of pairs of the same class to the national PKE program. Conditions (2.2c)
are participation constraints for pairs, ensuring that each pair of class i donates a kidney
only in return for receiving a kidney. Conditions (2.2d) are individual rationality constraints
for transplant centers, ensuring that the expected benefit of participating and accepting all
patient-donor pairs for each transplant center is at least as large as the alternative of re-
jecting all patient-donor pairs upon admission. Conditions (2.2e) are incentive compatibility
constraints for transplant centers since they require that given a SAC profile s, each trans-
plant center seeks to maximize its own profit. Indeed, the societal model (2.2a) − (2.2g) is
a bilevel program where the transplant center model (2.1a) − (2.1e) for each c ∈ C is the
lower level problem and reflected by constraints (2.2e). Note that there are multiple (|C |)
lower level problems. Whenever there exist multiple optimal solutions for the lower level
problem (2.2e) for each c ∈ C , the one generating the highest profit for society is selected.
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In other words, we adopt the notion of optimistic formulation in bilevel programming. For
a comprehensive review about different formulations and relations between them in bilevel
programming, see Dempe (2002).
Remark 1. We may truncate our search space to a closed bounded interval in R for variable




optimal solution of problem (2.1a)−(2.1e) is z∗ic = λic, i.e., the optimal reaction of transplant
centers is to enroll all their patient-donor pairs of class i in the national PKE program. On
the other hand, if sic < −picric, then the optimal solution of problem (2.1a)−(2.1e) is z∗ic = 0,
i.e., the optimal reaction of transplant centers is to enroll none of their patient-donor pairs
of class i in the national PKE program. Let sic :=
∑
j∈I
rjcλjc and sic := −picric be upper and
lower bounds of sic, respectively.
2.4 A SINGLE-LEVEL FORMULATION
A bilevel MILP where the lower level is an LP can be transformed into a single-level MILP
that can be solved by state-of-the-art MILP solvers (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl 1981). Con-
versely, a bilevel MILP where the lower level is an MILP with 40 binary variables and a
single budget constraint is unsolvable by state-of-the-art approaches (DeNegre and Ralphs
2009, Tang et al. 2015). Note that the bilevel program (2.2a) − (2.2f) has 300 lower level
problems, each of which has at least 32 constraints and 256 integer variables. Our study in
this section reveals a rich network structure of the lower level problem (2.1a) − (2.1e) that
makes the bilevel program (2.2a)− (2.2f) tractable.
Lemmas 1 and 2 present a reformulation of the lower level problem (2.1a)− (2.1e), which
is used to reformulate the bilevel program (2.2a)−(2.2f) into an equivalent MILP. For a ∈ R,
let a+ := max{a, 0}, ⌊a⌋ be the floor of a, and {a} := a− ⌊a⌋.
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Lemma 1. For each c ∈ C , (x∗c , z∗c) is an optimal solution of (2.1a) − (2.1e) if and only if














xjic ∀i ∈ I , (2.3c)
xijc ∈ Z+ ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (2.3d)
and
z∗ic = λic −
∑
j∈Ei.
x∗ijc ∀i ∈ I for which picric + sic ≥ 0, (2.4a)
z∗ic = 0 ∀i ∈ I for which picric + sic < 0. (2.4b)
Proof. (⇒) : In the problem (2.1a)− (2.1e), zic appears only once in a constraint of (2.1b),
for each c ∈ C , i ∈ I . Therefore, if its objective function coefficient is nonnegative, its
optimal value should be such that (2.1b) is binding, so that (2.4a) is satisfied. On the other
hand, if the objective function coefficient of zic is strictly negative, then its optimal value
should be 0, so that (2.4b) is satisfied. Note that if the objective function coefficient of zic is
0, its optimal value may be any number between 0 and λic −
∑
j∈Ei.
x∗ijc, but since we use the
optimistic formulation of the bilevel program (2.2a)− (2.2g), the optimal value of zic should
satisfy (2.4a).
Therefore, to solve the problem (2.1a)− (2.1e), we only need to consider (xc, zc) in which
(2.4a) − (2.4b) are satisfied. After substituting zic by its equivalent from (2.4a) − (2.4b)
for each i ∈ I , projecting it out of the formulation, and considering integrality of xc,
(2.3a)− (2.3d) is obtained as a reformulation of (2.1a)− (2.1e). Note that after substituting



















After removing the last summation, which is a constant, (2.3a) is obtained.
(⇐) : The proof follows from the reverse steps of that of the first direction.
Lemma 2. For each c ∈ C , the LP relaxation of (2.3b)− (2.3d) is an integral polyhedron.
Proof. We represent constraints (2.3b) − (2.3c) as the projection of the constraints of a
minimum cost network flow problem (Ford and Fulkerson 1962). Note that (2.3c) clearly
correspond to the flow conservation constraints in a minimum cost network flow problem,
and (2.3b) may be represented as the capacity constraints as follows. We construct a network
by splitting each node i ∈ I of the underlying network of (2.3b)− (2.3c) into two separate
nodes and adding a fictitious arc with the capacity of ⌊λic⌋ between these two nodes. Then,
(2.3b) is equal to the capacity constraints after projecting out the variables associated with
the fictitious arcs.
Since the family of constraints of a minimum cost network flow problem is an integral
polyhedron (Ford and Fulkerson 1962) and the projection of an integral polyhedron is integral
(Balas 2005), it follows that the LP relaxation of (2.3b)− (2.3d) is integral.
Lemma 3. For each c ∈ C ,{
















xjic ∀i ∈ I
}
.
Proof. Clearly ⊆ holds. To see the other direction, for each xc belonging to the left set, by
















that all the inequalities describing the left set may be replaced by the equality form.
In the sequel, we seek to linearize problem (2.2a) − (2.2g) by Lemmas 1 − 3. For each














xjic ∀i ∈ I , (2.5c)
xijc ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (2.5d)
and ∆c(s) := {xc ∈ (2.5b) − (2.5d)|
∑
(i,j)∈E
(ric − (picric + sic)+)xijc ≥ ϕc(s)}. Lemmas 1 and
2 imply that for each c ∈ C , constraint (2.2e) may be rewritten as follows:
xc ∈ ∆c(s), (2.6a)
zic = λic −
∑
j∈Ei.
xijc ∀i ∈ I for which picric + sic ≥ 0, (2.6b)
zic = 0 ∀i ∈ I for which picric + sic < 0. (2.6c)






s.t. vic,1 + vic,2 − vjc,2 ≥ ric − (picric + sic)+ ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (2.7b)
vic,1, vic,2 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I , (2.7c)
where vic,1 and vic,2 are dual variables for constraints (2.5b) and (2.5c), respectively. Note
that variable vic,2 is unrestricted in the dual of (2.5a) − (2.5c), but Lemma 3 implies that
it may be considered to be nonnegative as in (2.7c). It can easily be seen that the primal
(2.5a)− (2.5c) and its dual (2.7a)− (2.7c) are always feasible and bounded.
15
A significant consequence of our arguments so far is that the bilevel model (2.2a)−(2.2g)























yij ≤ αi +
∑
c∈C
























λicdic ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ C ,
(2.11)
−Mgic ≤ zic +
∑
j∈Ei.
xijc − λic ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C ,
(2.12)
0 ≤ zic ≤ M(1− gic) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C ,
(2.13)











xjic ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C ,
(2.16)
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0 ≤ xijc ≤ Mqijc ∀(i, j) ∈ E , c ∈ C , (2.17)
0 ≤ vic,1 + vic,2 − vjc,2 − ric + h+ic ≤ M(1− qijc) ∀(i, j) ∈ E , c ∈ C , (2.18)
h+ic − h−ic = picric + sic ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.19)
0 ≤ vic,1 ≤ M(1− wic) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.20)
zic = {λic}(1− gic) +
∑
k∈Kic
2keick ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.21)
τick ≥ sic − sic(1− eick) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , k ∈ Kic, (2.22)
τick ≥ siceick ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , k ∈ Kic, (2.23)
τick ≤ sic − sic(1− eick) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , k ∈ Kic, (2.24)
τick ≤ siceick ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , k ∈ Kic, (2.25)
πic ≥ sic − sicgic ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.26)
πic ≥ sic(1− gic) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.27)
πic ≤ sic − sicgic ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.28)
πic ≤ sic(1− gic) ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.29)
eick ∈ {0, 1}, τick unrestricted ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , k ∈ Kic, (2.30)





ic ≥ 0, wic ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.32)
qijc ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E , c ∈ C , (2.33)
gic ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I , c ∈ C , (2.34)
yij ∈ Z+ ∀(i, j) ∈ E , (2.35)
sic unrestricted ∀i ∈ I , (2.36)
where M is a sufficiently large constant. The family of constraints (2.12)− (2.14) and (2.34)
is an MILP reformulation of (2.6b) − (2.6c). Also, the family of constraints (2.15) − (2.20)
and (2.32) − (2.33) is an MILP variant of (2.6a), and is derived from the complementary
slackness theorem of LP duality. For further details on how to reformulate a lower level LP
as a family of MILP constraints, see, e.g., Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981). The family
of constraints (2.21) − (2.31), (2.13), and (2.34) is to linearize the term siczic in (2.2a),
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and are derived from Lemma (1), replacing the binary decomposition of zic, and using well
known linearization techniques (Glover 1975). Moreover, the base of the logarithm is 2, and
Kic := {0, 1, · · · , ⌊log λic⌋} for all i ∈ I and c ∈ C . As the parameter λic is small in our
practical setting, the binary decomposition of zic does not explode the model size. The next
theorem formalizes our arguments in this section.
Theorem 1. The optimal solution of the MILP (2.8) − (2.36) coincides with that of the
bilevel program (2.2a)− (2.2g).
2.5 CALIBRATION
In this section, we calibrate our model using a data set that will be described in detail in
what follows.
Patient-donor pair classes. We partition patient-donor pairs by ABO blood types of
the patient and the donor of a pair (cf. Ünver 2010). Specifically, there are four ABO blood
types for each patient and each donor: O, A, B, AB. Hence, there are sixteen patient-donor
pair classes. We denote a class as X-Y if the patient and the donor of each pair in the class
have blood types X and Y, respectively. For instance, Class A-B consists of all pairs whose
patients and donors have blood types A and B, respectively.
Compatibility. A patient who is biologically compatible with a donor can receive
the donor’s kidney. Biological compatibility consists of both blood-type and tissue-type
compatibilities. As noted earlier, there are four ABO blood types: O, A, B, AB. Blood-type
compatibility possesses a well-defined structure as follow: (1) An O (blood-type) patient is
blood-type compatible only with O donors. (2) An A patient is blood-type compatible with
both O and A donors. (3) A patient of blood-type B is blood-type compatible with both O
and B donors. (4) An AB patient is blood-type compatible with all donors. When a patient
and a donor are blood-type compatible, tissue-type compatibility should be investigated.
Unlike blood-type compatibility, tissue-type compatibility lacks a well-defined structure.
Tissue-type incompatibility occurs due to the presence of antibodies in a patient’s blood
cells that would damage the kidney from a specific donor. These antibodies rise for several
18
reasons, mostly from exposure to another person’s cells, usually due to pregnancy, blood
transfusion or prior transplant. To detect the presence of antibodies, the cross-match test is
conducted in which the bloods of the patient and the donor are mixed. If the donor’s cells
die, the cross-match is positive, i.e., the patient cannot receive a kidney from the donor.
Otherwise, they are compatible. This implies that before conducting a cross-match test, it
is impossible to realize whether a patient is tissue-type compatible with a specific donor. As
a consequence of this restriction, tissue-type compatibility has not been modeled in many
related papers (e.g., Roth et al. 2007, Ünver 2010). Following this stream of literature, we
too skip tissue-type compatibility by the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (Roth et al. 2007, Ünver 2010) No patient is tissue-type incompatible with
the donor of another pair.
Note that a patient may be tissue-type incompatible with his intended donor, and arrival
rates of blood-type compatible patient-donor pairs to the national PKE program is hence
allowed to be greater than zero.
Arrival rates of patient-donor pairs. As data regarding the parameter λic for all
i ∈ I and c ∈ C are unavailable, we describe a process to estimate this set of parameters.
This process consists of two steps: First, we estimate the number of patient-donor pairs in
each class in the United States. Second, we estimate how patient-donor pairs are distributed
among transplant centers based on the number of kidney transplants performed in each
transplant center so far.
By following the approach described in Saidman et al. (2006), the most prevalent ap-
proach in the literature, we derive the probability distribution of patient-donor classes in the
United States. The necessary data to apply the approach of Saidman et al. (2006) is based
on SRTR (2015) and reported in Table 1. Note that the calculated panel reactive antibody
(CPRA) in Table 1 is a measure of sensitization level, and estimates the percentage of donors
that would be tissue-type incompatible with a patient. Table 2 reports the resulting prob-
ability distribution of patient-donor classes in the United States. This table implies that
46.68% of patient-donors are compatible. The number of living-donor transplants in 2012
is 5,346 (SRTR 2015). As of 2010, around 1000 PKEs have been conducted in the United
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States (Rees et al. 2012), although over 15000 living-donor transplants have been conducted
only in 2010-2012 (SRTR 2015). Hence, with a slight loss of accuracy, we can say that almost
all 5,346 living-donor transplants in 2012 have been performed on compatible patient-donor
pairs. Therefore, the total number of compatible and incompatible patient-donor pairs in the
United States may conservatively be estimated as 11, 000 ≈ 5,346
0.4668
. Given that we estimated
the patient-donor population size and the distribution of patient-donor classes, the number
of patient-donor pairs within each class in the United States may easily be estimated.
The number of kidney transplants performed in each transplant center from the start of
living-donor transplant in 1988 to the end of 2014 is available at OPTN Data 2015. Assuming
that the number of incompatible patient-donor pairs arriving at each transplant center is
proportional to the number of kidney transplants performed in the transplant center, we can
estimate how patient-donor pairs are distributed across transplant centers. Knowing this
distribution and the number of patient-donor pairs within each class in the United States,
we can estimate the parameter λic for all i ∈ I and c ∈ C . Finally, we let αi = 0 for all
i ∈ I .
Table 1: Probability characteristics of the patient-donor population.













Unrelated living donors Frequency (percent)
Spouse 48.97
Other 51.03
The distributions are based on SRTR (2015).
Probabilities. To estimate the parameter pic for all i ∈ I and c ∈ C , we consider
a hypothetical pool in which all patient-donor pairs are enrolled. Then, we match patient-
donor pairs in this pool with the goal of maximizing the number of transplants. Next, we
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Table 2: Distribution of patient-donor population.
Incompatible patient-donor population
Patient blood type
Donor blood type O A B AB
O 0.0716 0.0421 0.0217 0.0045
A 0.1541 0.0247 0.0467 0.0026
B 0.0794 0.0467 0.0066 0.0014
AB 0.0164 0.0096 0.0050 0.0003
Compatible patient-donor population
Patient blood type
Donor blood type O A B AB
O 0.1906 0.1120 0.0577 0.0119
A 0.0000 0.0659 0.0000 0.0070
B 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0036
AB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007
This distribution is derived from Table 1.
estimate pic for all i ∈ I and c ∈ C by the proportion of patients belonging to class i ∈ I
who are transplanted in the hypothetical pool. These probabilities are reported in Table 3.
Our approach to estimate the parameter pic is plausible because: (1) As will be shown,
our numerical results demonstrate that a significant portion of patient-donor pairs should be
enrolled in the national PKE program under an equilibrium payment strategy. (2) The size
of a transplant center’s pool is insignificant compared to that of a national pool, and hence
the chance of being matched in a national PKE program for an arbitrary patient-donor pair
is almost independent of a single transplant center’s decisions.
Table 3: Probabilities of being matched in a national PKE program for an incompatible
patient-donor pair.
Patient blood type
Donor blood type O A B AB
O 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
A 0.2796 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
B 0.3165 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
AB 0.0000 0.3714 0.9630 1.0000
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Societal reward. Each kidney transplant saves society one life and thousands of dol-
lars in foregone medical expenses. Matas and Schnitzler (2003) studied the benefits of
living-donor transplant and quantified its value by a cost-effectiveness analysis. In their
comprehensive study, they considered different factors such as patient survival, cost of dial-
ysis, graft survival, death with function, death after graft loss, cost of organ acquisition,
cost of transplant, maintenance cost with graft function, and cost of return to dialysis after
living-donor transplant. They found that each additional living-donor transplant is worth at
least $269,319 for society. After incorporating inflation (consumer price index), the updated
value of an additional living-donor transplant (Ri for all i ∈ I ) is $334,648.46 (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2015).
Transplant center costs and rewards. The donor’s pre-match cost (dic) encompasses
expenses for a set of procedures such as blood testing, electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, blood-
work, urine tests, pressure check, medical history and physical examination, psychosocial
assessment, education session, CT scan, and surgeon visit. Depending on the donor’s gen-
der, age, and genetic make-up other medical tests may be required, e.g., mammogram, pap
smear, prostate-specific antigen, exercise stress test and a 2-hour glucose tolerance test. In
this regard, we contacted the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center staff who estimated
dic to be $1,554.82 on average for all i ∈ I and c ∈ C (Tevar 2015).
For conducting each kidney transplant, each transplant center receives an income in
return for providing different services such as physical, psychological, and laboratory evalu-
ations, room, board, and ancillary services, and etc. Bentley (2014) investigated the related
expenses in the interval of one month pre-transplant to six months post-transplant. The
income of a transplant center for each kidney transplant is $419,200 on average (Bentley
2014). Moreover, hospital operating margin was 5.7% in 2013 (American Hospital Associa-
tion 2015). As a result, we can estimate ric to be $419, 200×0.057 = $23, 894.4 for all i ∈ I
and c ∈ C .
22
2.6 POLICY INSIGHTS
There are various frameworks on which a national PKE program may be established. Our
model can quantify benefits of these frameworks for society and different stakeholders, and
provide valuable policy insights.
2.6.1 Benefits of a National PKE Program
Although it is intuitive that a national (centralized) PKE program would perform better than
the current (decentralized) PKE program, it is important to provide quantitative insights
about benefits of a national PKE program for different stakeholders. Indeed, we must ensure
that benefits of establishing a national PKE program outweigh its setup and variable costs.
The more the benefits of a national PKE program are realized, the more incentives for society
exist to establish such a program as soon as possible. Hence, we compare the performance
of a national PKE program with that of a decentralized PKE program with respect to the
following criteria:
C.1 The societal objective, which is the value of (2.2a),
C.2 The total number of transplants,
C.3 The total number of internal transplants,
C.4 The total income of transplant centers,
C.5 The total cost of insurance companies.
Table 4 reports these criteria under several different settings. For each setting, C.1-C.3 are
obtained by running the model (2.8)− (2.36) with parameters extracted from the associated
data set. Given that each transplant surgery brings $419,200 income to a transplant center,
C.4 is equal to C.2 multiplied by 419,200. Annual cost of an ESRD patient treated with
hemodialysis and transplant are, respectively, $90,026.89 and $32,803.99 in 2015 (Rees et al.
2012, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). For each setting, C.5 is annual total of such costs
for all patient-donor pairs.
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Table 4 demonstrates that a national PKE program, as compared to a decentralized
PKE program, leads to saving 1,340 additional lives, enhancing the societal objective by
more than $0.5 billion, increasing transplant centers’ income by more than $0.5 billion, and
decreasing insurance costs by $75 million annually. Of note, 1,296 patient-donor pairs are
internally transplanted in the national PKE program, which is more than half of the number
of patient-donor pairs who are all internally transplanted in a decentralized PKE program.
Internal transplants are favorable in the sense that the associated patient-donor pairs do not
need to move across transplant centers, which is more convenient and suppresses traveling
costs for these patient-donor pairs.
2.6.2 SAC Settings
Note that in our model, the SAC compensation sic depends on patient-donor pair class
i and transplant center c. We call this setting center-and-pair-dependent SAC. Although
this setting seems plausible, other possible settings for SAC compensation are: (1) Pair-
dependent SAC : Drop the dependency on transplant center c and have a SAC compensation
si that depends only on patient-donor pair class i. (2) Center-dependent SAC : Drop the
dependency on patient-donor pair class i and have a SAC compensation sc that depends
only on transplant center c. (3) Fixed SAC : Drop the dependency on both transplant center
c and patient-donor class i and have a SAC compensation s that is fixed for all transplant
center c ∈ C and patient-donor class i ∈ I . Clearly, the societal benefit of a center-
and-pair-dependent-SAC setting is higher than that of the other settings. However, it is
not clear which setting works better in practice since each one has its own advantages and
disadvantages. For instance, as a disadvantage of a center-dependent SAC, Rees et al. (2012)
noted that “As the number of KPD [kidney paired donation] transplants performed at each
center may be highly variable, such an approach may lead to large variability in center-specific
KPD SAC charges and payment of widely disparate costs between transplant centers could be
a disincentive to centers participating in such exchanges.” To investigate the benefits of these
settings, we report their associatedC.1-C.5 in Table 4. As this table shows, all these different
settings result in the same number of transplants, which in turn leads to identical transplant
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centers’ income and insurance cost. However, they have different societal objective values.














whose first term is the reward related to transplants and second term is the amount money
spent on (earned by) the participation of transplant centers. The amount of the first term
is $1.269 billion under the optimal SAC compensations for all the settings. However, the
amount of the second term is $88 million, $65 million, 0, and 0 for the center-and-pair-
dependent SAC, the pair-dependent SAC, the center-dependent SAC, and the fixed SAC,
respectively, which leads to different societal objectives for these settings. Of note, in the
center-and-pair-dependent SAC and the pair-dependent SAC, the national PKE program
makes 88, 65 million dollar annual income, respectively, which justifies the cost of establishing
and running a national PKE program. Given the space limitation, we are unable to report
the optimal SAC compensations for the center-and-pair-dependent SAC and the center-
dependent SAC. We report the optimal SAC compensations for the pair-dependent SAC in
Table 5. In addition, the optimal SAC compensation for the fixed SAC setting is equal to
zero, which means that transplant centers pay nothing for participation in the national PKE
program.
2.6.3 Authoritarian Setting
A hypothetical setting of interest is when transplant centers are required by a law to fully
participate in a national PKE program. Specifically, transplant centers should enroll all their
patient-donor pairs in the national PKE program, and they do not receive (or pay) any money
for that. We call this setting authoritarian, and report its associated C.1-C.5 in Table 4.
The results of this table show that the authoritarian setting cannot reach more transplants
than those of any SAC-based setting, and hence there is no benefit in enforcing transplant
centers to participate in a national PKE program. Indeed, as noted earlier, transplant centers
are even willing to annually pay $88, $65 million for enrolling their patient-donor pairs in
a national PKE program with a center-and-pair-dependent SAC or a pair-dependent SAC,
respectively.
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Table 4: Annual total reward (cost) of different stakeholders under different settings.
SAC settting C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5
Center-and-pair-dependent SAC $1.357E+09 3793 1296 $1.590E+09 $3.109E+08
Pair-dependent SAC $1.335E+09 3793 9 $1.590E+09 $3.109E+08
Center-dependent SAC $1.269E+09 3793 1586 $1.590E+09 $3.109E+08
Fixed SAC $1.269E+09 3793 1731 $1.590E+09 $3.109E+08
Decentralized $8.209E+08 2453 2453 $1.028E+09 $3.875E+08
Authoritarian $1.269E+09 3793 N/A $1.590E+09 $3.109E+08
2.6.4 Participation of Compatible Patient-donor Pairs
Recall that, based on the physiological compatibility, patient-donor pairs are classified into
two groups: (1) compatible patient-donor pairs, and (2) incompatible patient-donor pairs.
The patient can receive the donor’s kidney for each compatible patient-donor pair, but
this is not the case for an incompatible patient-donor pair. PKE is a modality to resolve
this issue of incompatible patient-donor pairs, and clearly compatible patient-donor pairs
lack incentives to participate in a PKE. Hence, a national PKE program will be restricted
only to incompatible patient-donor pairs. However, a national PKE program will reach far
more benefits if compatible patient-donor pairs participate in the program by letting it find
compatible matches for them. Sonmez and Ünver (2015) proposed a new incentive scheme
to encourage compatible patient-donor pairs to participate, and analyzed potentials of the
scheme in terms of enhancing efficiency and equity. To illuminate advantages of compatible
patient-donor pair participation, we run our model for this case and report its results in
Table 6 for settings described in Subsection 2.6.1. Note that the setting “Current” in Table
6 presents the situation where compatible patient-donor pairs do no participate and PKE
for incompatible patient-donor pairs is conducted in a decentralized setting.
Table 6 demonstrates that a national PKE program with participation of compatible
patient-donor pairs compared to what current practice in the United States PKE program
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Table 5: Optimal SAC compensations in US dollars by patient-donor blood types.
Patient blood type
Donor blood type O A B AB
O $-23894.4 $-23894.4 $-23894.4 $201724
A $-6682.07 $-23894.4 $-23894.4 $0
B $-7562.82 $-23894.4 $-23225.9 $0
AB $0 $-8875.1 $-19359.8 $0
will save at least 3400 additional lives, enhancing the societal objective by $1.38 billion,
increasing transplant centers’ income by $1.43 billion, and decreasing insurance costs by
$0.195 billion annually. Note that, these benefits are almost three times as large as those if
compatible patient-donor pairs do not participate. In particular, a national PKE program
with participation of compatible patient-donor pairs creates $0.847 billion more profit for
society than that without participation of compatible patient-donor pairs. This additional
profit may be invested in incentivizing compatible patient-donor pairs to participate. Note
that we are fully aware of ethical dilemmas on monetary transfer in organ exchange, and
we do not recommend its use. We only seek to shed light on advantages of participation of
compatible patient-donor pairs.
All the SAC-based settings provide roughly the same number of transplants which in
turn leads to the same transplant centers’ income and insurance costs. Moreover, center-
and-pair dependent SAC, pair-dependent SAC, and center-dependent SAC settings deliver
almost the same societal objective. However, the societal objective of the fixed SAC setting is
$0.225 billion smaller than those of the other SAC-based settings. Finally, the authoritarian
setting delivers (almost) the same number of transplants as that of any SAC-based setting,
and however its societal objective is at least $0.225 billion smaller than those of center-and-
pair dependent SAC, pair-dependent SAC, and center-dependent SAC settings. This $0.225
billion represents the amount of money that a national PKE program charges transplant
centers for enrolling their patient-donor pairs.
27
Table 6: Annual total reward (cost) of different stakeholders under different settings when
compatible patient-donor pairs participate.
SAC setting C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5
Center-and-pair-dependent SAC $3.923E+09 10990 2169 $4.607E+09 $3.614E+08
Pair-dependent SAC $3.903E+09 10992 36 $4.608E+09 $3.613E+08
Center-dependent SAC $3.923E+09 10990 2169 $4.607E+09 $3.614E+08
Fixed SAC $3.698E+09 10992 0 $4.608E+09 $3.613E+08
Current $2.539E+09 7587 2453 $3.180E+09 $5.561E+08
Authoritarian $3.678E+09 10992 N/A $4.608E+09 $3.613E+08
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3.0 OPTIMIZING OVER PURE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA IN
CONSENSUS STOPPING GAMES
3.1 MOTIVATION
Discrete-time stochastic games have modeled dynamic competitive interactions among mul-
tiple players since they were introduced by Shapley (1953). A stochastic game consists of
periods, states, actions, rewards, players, and transition probabilities. In each period, the
stochastic game occupies a state, and all players choose their actions simultaneously and
independently. Subsequently, each player receives a reward that depends on the current
state and the actions of all players. The game transitions to the next state according to a
discrete probability distribution, conditioned on the current state and the chosen actions.
Each player seeks to maximize his own reward criterion, e.g., his total expected discounted
reward.
A strategy for each player specifies a probability distribution over the feasible actions
in each period conditioned on the current state and the history of the game up to that
period. If this distribution depends only on the current state, then the strategy is called
stationary. A strategy is called pure when all the probabilities are in {0, 1}. A (stationary)
strategy profile is a collection of (stationary) strategies of all players that fully specifies all
actions in the game, and it must include one and only one (stationary) strategy for each
player (Solan 2012). To analyze stochastic games, there are several solution concepts such
as Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and stationary equilibrium. A subgame-
perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the
original game. A stationary equilibrium is a stationary strategy profile that maximizes every
0This chapter is based on Dehghanian et al. (2015).
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player’s reward criterion in each state (among all stationary and non-stationary strategy
profiles) given the strategies of the other players. Equivalently, a stationary equilibrium
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium that is stationary. There are several reasons to analyze
stationary equilibria in stochastic games. First, it prescribes the simplest form of behavior
that is consistent with rationality. Second, compared to subgame-perfect equilibrium, a
stationary equilibrium represents the notion of being free from the past, i.e., “bygones are
bygones”, more completely through a state-contingent behavior (Maskin and Tirole 2001).
The existence of a stationary equilibrium for a discounted stochastic game with finite state
and action spaces has long been established (e.g., Fink 1964, Sobel 1971).
Stochastic games are very challenging since it is often difficult to characterize even sta-
tionary equilibria (Doraszelski and Escobar 2010, Hörner et al. 2011). Solan (2012) notes
that “Unfortunately, to date there are no efficient algorithms to calculate either the value in
zero-sum stochastic games, or equilibria in non-zero-sum games.” In many contexts, players
may prefer to use pure stationary strategies; however, the characterization of pure station-
ary equilibria is even more challenging. Another issue that has limited the applicability
of stochastic games is the existence of multiple stationary equilibria, and it is difficult to
find all such equilibria (Aguirregabiria and Mira 2007). Two major complications arise as
consequences of the existence of multiple equilibria (Köppe et al. 2011): First, it becomes
more difficult to predict players’ behavior, and players may not reach an equilibrium at all.
Second, many existing methods find one equilibrium and provide no systematic methodology
to find all equilibria. Such complications raise an even more challenging question of finding
a best stationary equilibrium with respect to a given criterion in stochastic games.
We consider consensus stopping games, a broad class of stochastic stopping games defined
over a finite set of players, states, actions, and rewards. Such a game dynamically evolves
over an infinite-horizon setting. In each period of the game, each player decides whether to
offer to stop or continue the game. If all players offer to stop, the game terminates, and each
player receives a lump-sum stopping reward. Conversely, if at least one player decides to
continue, each player receives an immediate continuation reward, the game moves into the
next state according to a Markovian transition, and the rest of the players must continue,
regardless of their decisions. In this chapter, we study the problem of finding a best pure
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stationary equilibrium for this class of games. Our primary motivations for studying this
problem include, but not limited to: (1) Optimizing over (pure stationary) equilibria, rather
than identifying such equilibria is inherently interesting, and we are the first who investigate
it comprehensively. (2) Consensus stopping games are an important class of stochastic games
with various applications, as discussed in the rest of this section.
Consensus stopping games arise in the context of consensus decision-making, which is
indeed used by many international organizations in policy making. For instance, the Council
of the European Union requires unanimity in some policy areas such as membership, taxa-
tion, social security, foreign and common defense policy and operational police cooperation
among the Member States (The Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The World Trade Organization, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Executive Committee of the International
Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development all make
decisions by consensus (Steinberg 2002). Indeed, in consensus decision-making, every player
has a veto in the sense that he can prevent a change from the status quo (Tsebelis 2002).
In principle, consensus stopping games may model many dynamic noncooperative con-
sensus decision-making environments to reach a permanent agreement. We elaborate on the
elements of a consensus stopping game, e.g., the players, periods, actions, states, rewards,
and transition probabilities, for two specific applications.
• Organ exchange. ESRD, as described in Chapter 2, is the final stage of chronic kidney
disease in which both kidneys almost fail. The preferred choice of treatment for ESRD
is living-donor transplantation, in which a living-donor donates one of his kidneys to the
patient. A significant barrier to greater use of living-donors is that at least one-third of
the patients with a willing living-donor are unable to receive the donor’s kidney due to
blood type and/or tissue incompatibilities (Montgomery et al. 2005b). To mitigate this
barrier, an emerging clinical practice is PKE in which N ≥ 2 self-interested patient-donor
pairs for whom the only compatible exchange of kidneys is cyclical, swap their donors
(see Figure 2). Periodically, each patient-donor pair decides whether to offer to exchange
or not. If at least one patient-donor pair decides not to offer to exchange, the transplant
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Figure 2: A cycle of N patient-donor pairs for a PKE, where Di refers to donor of intended
recipient (or patient) Pi. Directed arcs in the cycle represent compatibility between patients
and donors; that is, no donor is compatible with his intended recipient but only compatible
with the intended recipient of the next donor in the cycle.
exchange cycle breaks as each donor is willing to donate a kidney only in return for
receiving a kidney for his indended recipient. Therefore, the transplants in the cycle are
accomplished if and only if all patient-donor pairs offer to exchange consensually. To value
a given PKE cycle when the timing of the transplants is determined by self-interested,
autonomous patient-donor pairs, Kurt et al. (2011) propose a consensus stopping game in
which the players are the patient-donor pairs, the decision epochs are biweekly, and the
players’ actions are whether to offer to exchange or not. The glomerular filtration rates
(GFRs), a measure of kidney functionality, of all patients are considered as the state
of the game. Roughly speaking, the immediate continuation and stopping rewards are
estimated by the expected number of days until the next decision epoch (fourteen days)
and the expected number of post-transplant survival days for each patient, respectively.
A transition probability matrix for the case of not offering to exchange describes the
Markovian progression of the GFRs. Finally, Kurt et al. (2011) represent the problem
of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium of the game as an MILP which they solve
using a commercial MILP solver. Consensus stopping games may be applied to model
the timing of transplants for other organ exchange problems, e.g., lung exchange (Ergin
et al. 2015).
• War termination. Two countries fight a war against each other until reaching peace
or one side’s definite victory, whichever occurs first. Periodically, each country chooses
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between continuing the war and offering peace. The war ends if and only if both countries
offer peace simultaneously. This situation may be modeled by a consensus stopping
game in which the players are countries, the decision epochs are, for example, daily,
and the actions are whether to continue the war or offer peace. Political scientists
have utilized the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score to measure
power of a country and explain war outcomes. In calculating CINC scores, geopolitical
factors such as a country’s relative military, economic, and demographic capabilities are
considered (e.g., Singer et al. 1972, Singer 1988). Therefore, we may consider the CINC
scores of both countries as the state of the game. The expected increase in the area of the
occupied territories and the total area of the occupied territories since the beginning of the
war may be regarded as the immediate continuation and stopping rewards, respectively.
A transition probability matrix for the dynamic evolution of the CINC scores in the
case of continuing the war reflects exogenous factors, which are out of the control of
both countries, such as natural events, third parties’ actions, etc. Other models of war
termination may be found in the political science literature. For instance, Filson and
Werner (2002) present a two-stage asymmetric information bargaining game by which
they provide several insights on the onset and termination of war. As another instance,
Cunningham (2006) studies the correlation between the duration of a civil war and the
number of veto players. This statistical analysis shows that the more the number of veto
players, the longer the conflict.
3.1.1 Summary of Contributions
Motivated by consensus decision-making and its applications, we consider consensus stop-
ping games. Our study reveals a rich structure of these games that allows us to investigate
the problem of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium. Such a problem has not been com-
prehensively investigated before for a class of stochastic games. The specific contributions
of this chapter are as follows: First, we establish that the problem of finding a best pure
stationary equilibrium of a consensus stopping game is NP-hard. Second, we characterize
the pure stationary equilibria, and show that they form an independence system. Accord-
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ingly, we derive two families of combinatorial valid inequalities for an MILP developed for
the problem of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium. Third, we develop an efficient
branch-and-cut algorithm to solve the MILP by applying these valid inequalities. We also
develop a family of Pareto-optimal optimality cuts and several algorithmic enhancements.
Our extensive computational experiments show that the algorithm significantly outperforms
a state-of-the-art commercial MILP solver.
This work is the first to provide combinatorial characterizations of stationary equilibria
for a class of stochastic games. It is also the first attempt to develop a novel cutting plane
approach for the problem of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium for a class of stochastic
games.
3.1.2 Outline of the Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we review the litera-
ture. In Section 3.3 we define consensus stopping games and the problem of finding a best
pure stationary equilibrium, which we show to be NP-hard in Section 3.4. We character-
ize the pure stationary equilibria and develop two families of valid inequalities in Section
3.5. In Section 3.6 we develop an MILP formulation that optimizes over the set of pure
stationary equilibria. We develop a branch-and-cut approach in Section 3.7, and describe
our computational experiments in Section 3.8.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The stochastic game literature is vast (see the recent survey by Solan 2012). In the eco-
nomics literature, stochastic games typically model dynamic interactions among firms (Eric-
son and Pakes 1995, Doraszelski and Satterthwaite 2010). To find a stationary equilibrium
of a stochastic game, a common approach is to apply the homotopy method (Herings and
Peeters 2004, Borkovsky et al. 2010). Weintraub et al. (2008) introduce the oblivious equi-
librium notion for Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style models, and show that it can approximate
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stationary equilibria under some conditions. Weintraub et al. (2010) develop an algorithm
for computing an oblivious equilibrium. In the operations research literature, mathemati-
cal programming has been used to compute a stationary equilibrium of stochastic games.
For instance, Filar and Vrieze (1997) and Raghavan and Syed (2003) compute a stationary
equilibrium for certain classes of stochastic games. Filar et al. (1991) present a nonlin-
ear programming formulation whose global optima are the stationary equilibria of a finite
discounted stochastic game; however, there was no computational study. Note that these
approaches attempt to identify a single stationary equilibrium, and because of the multi-
plicity of stationary equilibria in stochastic games (Herings and Peeters 2004, Aguirregabiria
and Mira 2007, Doraszelski and Satterthwaite 2010), they may be viewed as heuristics for
finding a best stationary equilibrium.
Our work is also related to the literature of stopping games (for a survey, cf. Nowak
and Szajowski 2005, Part III). The literature includes different variants for the definition of
stopping games (Heller 2012). This stream of research usually addresses the existence of an
equilibrium (cf. Solan and Vieille 2001, Shmaya and Solan 2004, Heller 2012).
What distinguishes this work from the literature of stochastic games and stopping games
is that we focus on the more challenging question of finding a best pure stationary equilib-
rium, compared to the question of finding a stationary equilibrium or the question of estab-
lishing the existence of an equilibrium because for consensus stopping games, (1) finding a
stationary equilibrium is trivial; (2) the game may possess many pure stationary equilibria,
many of which may be Pareto-inefficient with respect to the players’ payoff profile; and (3)
we are able to optimize over pure stationary equilibria by providing effective algorithmic
approaches to choose among those equilibria.
3.3 CONSENSUS STOPPING GAMES
We provide a detailed description of consensus stopping games, and present necessary and
sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be a pure stationary equilibrium. We define a
consensus stopping game, G, as follows: Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} be a set of players, and S
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represent the finite state space of G. In each period, each player decides whether to offer
to stop or continue based on the current state s ∈ S . All players make their decisions
independently and simultaneously, and ai(s) ∈ B := {0, 1} denotes player i’s action in state
s, where ai(s) is 1 if he offers to stop, and 0 otherwise. Because we only focus on pure
stationary strategies, ai(s) is sufficient to characterize the action of player i in state s in
each period. If all players offer to stop in state s (i.e.,
∏
i∈N
ai(s) = 1), G terminates and each




ai(s) = 0), G moves into the next state s′ under a Markovian transition
probability P(s′|s) while each player i ∈ N receives an immediate continuation reward
ui(s, 0). Each player i ∈ N has a periodic discount factor λi ∈ [0, 1), accounting for the
time value of his future rewards, and he seeks to maximize his total expected discounted
reward. G is an almost perfect information game, i.e., at the beginning of each period,
all players are perfectly informed of the current state along with all the actions and states
that have already been realized. Note that relative to Kurt et al. (2011), G permits more
general state space and reward structures. Specifically, the reward ui(s, 0) or ui(s, 1) may be
negative, and the state space S need not be the Cartesian product of the individual player’s
state spaces.
We follow the convention that a term in bold refers to a real-valued vector; i.e., v




′|s)v(s′) for any s ∈ S , i ∈ N , which we interpret as player i’s expected
continuation payoff starting from state s where v represents the payoffs of all possible states
at the next period. In the sequel of this chapter, unless otherwise stated, we use the terms
strategy and equilibrium to refer to pure stationary strategy and pure stationary equilibrium,
respectively. Let ai := ⟨ai(s)⟩s∈S denote a strategy of player i for each i ∈ N , a := ⟨ai⟩i∈N
denote the resulting strategy profile. Moreover, let wai (s) denote the total expected dis-
counted reward of player i in state s under strategy profile a. To formalize this notion, let st
denote the state of the game in period t, and ri(st, a(st)) denote the reward of player i ∈ N
under strategy profile a when state st is realized. Then,











where E(·) represents the expectation operator under the probability distribution induced
by strategy profile a over the evolution of the states when the game is initialized in state
s. Accordingly, wai := ⟨wai (s)⟩s∈S represents the payoff vector for player i under strat-
egy profile a. In a slight abuse of notation, let wa := ⟨wai ⟩i∈N represent the payoff
profile under strategy profile a. The outcome of the players’ decisions (continuation or




ai(s), where x := ⟨x(s)⟩s∈S ∈ B|S | is the corresponding vector. Note that
if all players offer to stop, then x(s) = 1; otherwise, x(s) = 0. For each x ∈ B|S |, let
Ax :=
{
a ∈ B|S |×|N ||
∏
i∈N
ai(s) = x(s)∀s ∈ S
}
which represents the set of strategy profiles
inducing the same outcome for all s ∈ S .
Proposition 1. Given a strategy profile a with associated payoff profile wa:
















Furthermore, wa is the unique solution for this set of equations.
(ii) a is an equilibrium if and only if for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N :











Fi(s,wai ), Fi(s,wai )
 . (3.2)
(iii) For each x ∈ B|S |, there exists an equilibrium in Ax if and only if strategy profile ā,
defined by āi := x for all i ∈ N , is an equilibrium.
Proof. Parts (i) and (ii) are standard results in the literature of discounted stochastic games
(cf. Fink 1964). We provide the proof for part (iii).
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(⇒) Suppose there exists an equilibrium in Ax, denoted by ã. We show that strategy
profile ā is an equilibrium as well. Since ā, ã ∈ Ax, wã = wā by part (i). There are two
cases: If x(s) = 1, then for all i ∈ N , ãi(s) = āi(s) = 1, and
wāi (s) = w
ã
























Fi(s,wāi ), Fi(s,wāi )
 ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that ã is an equilibrium and part (ii).
If x(s) = 0, then for all i ∈ N , āi(s) = 0, and
wāi (s) = Fi(s,w
ā











Fi(s,wāi ), Fi(s,wāi )
 ,
where the first equality follows from part (i).
In summary, the equation (3.2) is satisfied for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N . Therefore, ā is an
equilibrium by part (ii).
(⇐) Follows directly from the definitions of ā and Ax.
For each x ∈ B|S |, Proposition 1 (i) implies that all strategy profiles in Ax have the same
payoff profile. In other words, x is necessary and sufficient information for characterizing the
payoff profile of a strategy profile a. As we are interested in studying the set of equilibrium
payoff profiles, by Proposition 1 (iii), it is sufficient to only focus on the set of strategy
profiles in which ai = x for all i ∈ N . We define such a set of strategy profiles as the set
of unanimous strategy profiles, since all players take the same action at each state s ∈ S .
Hereafter, we restrict our attention to the set of unanimous strategy profiles, and with a
slight abuse of notation, x ∈ B|S | represents a unanimous strategy profile. Accordingly,
we define wxi (s), w
x
i := ⟨wxi (s)⟩s∈S , and wx := ⟨wxi ⟩i∈N for unanimous strategy profile x.
We may restate Proposition 1 (i) and (ii) for unanimous strategy profiles as follows. (For
convenience we drop the word unanimous hereafter.)
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Proposition 2. Given a strategy profile x with associated payoff profile wx:
(i) For all s ∈ S , i ∈ N ,
wxi (s) = x(s)ui(s, 1) + (1− x(s))Fi(s,wxi ). (3.3)
Furthermore, wx is the unique solution for this set of equations.
(ii) x is an equilibrium if and only if for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N :
wxi (s) = max {x(s)ui(s, 1) + (1− x(s))Fi(s,wxi ), Fi(s,wxi )} . (3.4)
Proposition 2 follows immediately from Proposition 1, and the fact that strategy profile
x is unanimous. Part (i) describes how to calculate the payoff profile of a strategy profile,
and Part (ii) describes the Bellman-Shapley equations for G. Let 0 be the strategy profile
in which x(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S .
Remark 2. An attractive property of Proposition 2 (ii) is that when we assess equilibrium
conditions for a strategy profile x, we only need to check if the Bellman-Shapley equation
(3.4) is satisfied for each s ∈ S , i ∈ N in which x(s) = 1 since (3.4) is trivially satisfied
for each s ∈ S , i ∈ N in which x(s) = 0. In particular, Kurt (2012) formally shows that
the strategy profile 0 is an equilibrium. We prove a more general result, namely, that the set
of equilibria forms an independence system, in Section 3.5.
In this chapter, we study the problem of finding a best equilibrium, with respect to a
given linear objective function of payoffs, for G. Such an objective function is well accepted in
the literature of group decision analysis (cf. Eliashberg and Winkler 1981 and the references
therein). Let Ψ := {x ∈ B|S ||x is an equilibrium of G}, ci(s) ∈ R be an objective function
coefficient for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N , and c := ⟨ci(s)⟩s∈S ,i∈N . Therefore, the problem of finding
a best equilibrium is:
(P) : max{c⊤wx|x ∈ Ψ}. (3.5)
Note that by repeated application of equation (3.3), wx can be represented as a (highly)
nonlinear function of x. Therefore, c⊤wx is a nonlinear function of x as well. We present
an MILP formulation for (P) in Section 3.6.
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3.4 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In one-stage games, the computational complexity of finding a best pure Nash equilibrium
is NP-hard (cf. Gairing et al. 2004, Sperber 2010). In any stationary repeated game, each
pure stationary equilibrium is identical to a pure Nash equilibrium of a one-stage game, and
vice versa. Hence, the problem of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium is NP-hard in
repeated games, which in turn implies that the problem is NP-hard in stochastic games. In
this section, we establish the computational complexity of the problem for consensus stop-
ping games. For further discussion on computational complexity issues related to stochastic
games, see Conitzer and Sandholm (2008).
To establish the computational complexity of the problem of finding a best equilibrium
of G, it is sufficient to establish the computational complexity of its associated decision
problem, which is as follows: Given an instance of G, h ∈ R, and c ∈ R|S |×N , does there
exist an equilibrium x with associated payoff profile wx such that c⊤wx ≥ h?
Proposition 3. For any fixed number of players (N ≥ 2), the decision version of finding a
best equilibrium of G is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is in NP since given, a strategy profile x, the question of whether x is
an equilibrium with an objective function value of at least h can be verified in polynomial
time by Proposition 2.
We provide a proof by a reduction from Knapsack, a well-known NP-complete problem
(Karp 1972). Consider strictly positive numbers a1, a2, . . . , an, b, c1, c2, . . . , cn, k, we need to







Let N ≥ 2 be an arbitrary integer. We construct (in polynomial time) an instance of G, as
follows:












Figure 3: The transition probabilities structure for the instance of G constructed in the proof
of Proposition 3.
• S = {1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1},
• λi = 0.5 for all i ∈ N ,
• ui(s, 0) = 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N ,
• u1(s, 1) = 2nas, u2(s, 1) = 0 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
• u1(n+ 1, 1) = b, u2(n+ 1, 1) = 1,
• ui(s, 1) = 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ {3, . . . , N},
• P(s|n+ 1) = 1
n
for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
• P(s|s) = 1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
• c1(s) = cs2nas for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and c1(n+ 1) = 0,
• c2(s) = 0 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and c2(n+ 1) = 1 +
∑n
s=1 cs,
• ci(s) = 0 for all i ∈ {3, . . . , N}, s ∈ S .
We show that there exists an equilibrium with the objective function value of at least h :=
1+
∑n
s=1 cs+k for this instance of G if and only if the instance of Knapsack has a solution
with the total value of at least k.
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Under any strategy profile x, for each state s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, if x(s) = 1, then w1(s) =
u1(s, 1) = 2nas and w2(s) = u2(s, 1) = 0 by (3.3). Otherwise, if x(s) = 0, then
wx1 (s) = F1(s, w
x
1 ) = u1(s, 0) + λ1w
x
1 (s) = 0 +
1
2
wx1 (s) ⇒ wx1 (s) = 0,
wx2 (s) = F2(s, w
x
2 ) = u2(s, 0) + λ2w
x
2 (s) = 0 +
1
2
wx2 (s) ⇒ wx2 (s) = 0,
where we have made use of (3.3) and the definition of Fi(s, ·) to write the above equal-
ities. Consequently, wx1 (s) = 2nasx(s), w
x
2 (s) = 0, and it can easily be verified that the
Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is satisfied for each i ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} under an










s=1 asx(s) by the definition of Fi(s, ·) and our previous arguments re-
garding computing wx1 (s) for all s ∈ {1, · · · , n}, so the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is
satisfied if and only if either x(n+1) = 0, or x(n+1) = 1 jointly with
∑n
s=1 asx(s) ≤ b. For
state n+1 and player 2, u2(n+1, 1) = 1, F2(n+1,w
x





wx2 (s) = 0 by the defini-
tion of Fi(s, ·) and our previous arguments regarding computing wx2 (s) for all s ∈ {1, · · · , n},
so that the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is always satisfied, and wx2 (n+1) = x(n+1). For
each i ∈ {3, . . . , N}, s ∈ S , it can similarly be verified that wxi (s) = ui(s, 1) = Fi(s,wxi ) = 0,
and hence the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is satisfied. In summary, a strategy profile x is
an equilibrium if and only if either x(n+1) = 0, or x(n+1) = 1 jointly with
∑n
s=1 asx(s) ≤ b.


































For the nontrivial case k > 0, any equilibrium with the objective function value of at
least h must have x(n + 1) = 1 since h is larger than the objective function portion for
all s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let us couple each strategy profile ⟨x(s)⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} , x(n + 1) = 1 with
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a binary vector ⟨ys⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} by the one-to-one mapping x(s) = ys for all s ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and x(n + 1) = 1. As noted earlier, a strategy profile ⟨x(s)⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} , x(n + 1) = 1 is an
equilibrium if and only if
∑n
s=1 asx(s) ≤ b. Hence, a strategy profile ⟨x(s)⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} , x(n +
1) = 1 is an equilibrium if and only if its associated binary vector ⟨ys⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} is a feasible
solution for the instance of Knapsack. In addition, the objective function of the instance
of G for a strategy profile ⟨x(s)⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} , x(n + 1) = 1 is at least h if and only if the total
value of the associated binary vector ⟨ys⟩s∈{1,2,...,n} for the instance of Knapsack is at least
k.
3.5 CHARACTERIZING EQUILIBRIA AND COMBINATORIAL VALID
INEQUALITIES
In this section, we characterize the equilibria of G and develop two families of combinatorial
valid inequalities for (P) to improve its representation. We first need to define several
functions from the space of strategy profiles to the collection of all subsets of S as follows.
Given a strategy profile x, let:
S k(x) = {s ∈ S | x(s) = k} ∀k ∈ {0, 1}, (3.6a)
S ki,nv(x) = {s ∈ S k(x) | ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wxi )} ∀k ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N , (3.6b)
S ki,v(x) = {s ∈ S k(x) | ui(s, 1) < Fi(s,wxi )} ∀k ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N . (3.6c)
It can easily be seen that {S ki,v(x),S ki,nv(x)} is a partition of S k(x) for all i ∈ N , k ∈ {0, 1},
and {S 1(x),S 0(x)} is a partition of S for each strategy profile x. S 1(x),S 0(x) are the
sets of stopping and continuing states under x, respectively. S 1i,v(x) represents the set of
stopping states in which the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is violated for player i under
x; conversely, S 1i,nv(x) represents the set of stopping states in which the Bellman-Shapley
equation (3.4) is satisfied for player i under x. Although the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4)
is satisfied for states of S 0i,v(x) for player i, it could have been violated if x(s) had been 1
in those states. Hence, it may be thought of as the set of potentially equilibrium-violating
states for player i under x. The set S 0i,nv(x) can similarly be interpreted for player i under x.
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Specifically, it represents the set of continuing states in which the Bellman-Shapley equation
(3.4) is satisfied even if x(s) had been 1, so that they do not violate the Bellman-Shapley
equation (3.4) even with small perturbations in the strategy profile.
Proposition 4. Given a strategy profile x̄ with associated payoff profile wx̄:
(i) For some strategy profile x with associated payoff profile wx, suppose ∃ i ∈ N such
that S 1i,nv(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄). Then wxi (s) ≥ wx̄i (s) for all s ∈ S .
(ii) For some strategy profile x with associated payoff profile wx, suppose ∃ i ∈ N such
that S 1i,v(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄). Then wxi (s) ≤ wx̄i (s) for all s ∈ S .
Proof. Recall that under a fixed strategy profile x, the payoffs of each player represent a
stationary Markov reward process, and hence can be calculated by value iteration (Denardo
1967). Let [wxi (s)]
n denote the value associated with state s ∈ S at the nth iteration of the
value iteration algorithm under strategy profile x for player i. Furthermore, we initialize our
value iteration with payoffs of player i under x̄, i.e., [wxi (s)]
0 = wx̄i (s) for all s ∈ S .
(i) From Proposition 2 (i) and the hypothesis about the relation between x and x̄, there
are four cases:
If s ∈ S 1i,nv(x̄), then x(s) = 1 and [wxi (s)]1 = ui(s, 1) = wx̄i (s) = [wxi (s)]0.
If s ∈ S 0(x̄), then x(s) = 0 and [wxi (s)]1 = Fi(s, [wxi ]0) = Fi(s,wx̄i ) = wx̄i (s) = [wxi (s)]0.
If s ∈ S 1i,v(x̄) and x(s) = 1, then [wxi (s)]1 = ui(s, 1) = wx̄i (s) = [wxi (s)]0.
If s ∈ S 1i,v(x̄) and x(s) = 0, then [wxi (s)]1 = Fi(s, [wxi ]0) = Fi(s,wx̄i ) ≥ ui(s, 1) = wx̄i (s) =
[wxi (s)]
0 where the inequality follows from s ∈ S 1i,v(x̄).
From all four cases, it follows that [wxi (s)]
1 ≥ [wxi (s)]0 for all s ∈ S . By the monotonicity
of the dynamic programming operator induced by strategy profile x for player i (Blackwell
1965), it follows that for any n, [wxi (s)]




n ≥ [wxi (s)]0 = wx̄i (s).
(ii) The proof is similar to that of part (i).
Remark 3. In part (i) of Proposition 4, if S 1(x) ⊂ S 1(x̄), then there exists some ŝ ∈
S 1i,v(x̄) for which w
x
i (ŝ) > w
x̄
i (ŝ). In part (ii) of Proposition 4, if there exists some ŝ ∈
S 1i,nv(x̄) such that ui(ŝ, 1) > Fi(ŝ,w
x̄
i ) and x(ŝ) = 0, then w
x




Lemma 4. A strategy profile x is an equilibrium if and only if S 1i,v(x) = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
Proof. (⇒) If s ∈ S 1(x), then wxi (s) = ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wxi ) by Proposition 2. Therefore,
ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wxi ) for all s ∈ S 1(x), i ∈ N . It follows that S 1i,v(x) = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
(⇐) S 1(x) = S 1i,nv(x)∪S 1i,v(x) and S 1i,v(x) = ∅ for all i ∈ N . It follows that S 1(x) =
S 1i,nv(x) for all i ∈ N . Therefore, if s ∈ S 1(x), then for all i ∈ N , ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wxi ) and
Proposition 2 (i) implies that wxi (s) = ui(s, 1). Hence, the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4)
is satisfied for all s ∈ S 1(x), i ∈ N . As noted in Remark 2, the Bellman-Shapley equation
(3.4) is trivially satisfied for all s ∈ S 0(x), i ∈ N . Consequently, x is an equilibrium by
Proposition 2 (ii).
Proposition 5. Suppose a strategy profile x̄ is an equilibrium. For any strategy profile x
where S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄), the following hold:
(i) For all s ∈ S , i ∈ N , wxi (s) ≤ wx̄i (s).
(ii) x is an equilibrium.
Proof. (i) As x̄ is an equilibrium, S 1i,v(x̄) = ∅ for all i ∈ N by Lemma 4, and the hypothesis
states that S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄). Therefore, S 1i,v(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄) for all i ∈ N . The
result follows from Proposition 4 (ii).
(ii) If s ∈ S 1(x), then s ∈ S 1(x̄) = S 1i,nv(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄) = S 1i,nv(x̄) for all i ∈ N
since S 1i,v(x̄) = ∅ for all i ∈ N by Lemma 4. This implies that ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wx̄i ) for all
s ∈ S 1(x), i ∈ N . Moreover, wx̄i (s) ≥ wxi (s) for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N by part (i), and hence
Fi(s,w
x̄
i ) ≥ Fi(s,wxi ) for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N . Therefore, ui(s, 1) ≥ Fi(s,wx̄i ) ≥ Fi(s,wxi ) for
all s ∈ S 1(x), i ∈ N . So, S 1i,v(x) = ∅ for all i ∈ N . It follows from Lemma 4 that x is an
equilibrium.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 5 (ii).
Corollary 1. If a strategy profile x̄ is not an equilibrium, then any strategy profile x where
S 1(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x) is not an equilibrium.
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A well-known combinatorial structure is an independence system. Let I be a set, and
J be a set of subsets of I. The pair (I,J ) is an independence system if it satisfies two
conditions: First, the empty set is in J . Second, if I1 ⊂ I2 and I2 ∈ J , then I1 ∈ J (cf.
Nemhauser and Trotter Jr. 1974).
The next corollary immediately follows from Remark 2 and Proposition 5 (ii).
Corollary 2. Let J be the collection of all S 1(x) such that x is an equilibrium. The pair
(S ,J ) is an independence system.
Definition 1. An equilibrium x̄ is maximal if there does not exist any equilibrium x such
that S 1(x̄) ⊂ S 1(x).
Proposition 5 demonstrates that an equilibrium x̄ yields 2
∑
s∈S x̄(s) − 1 additional equi-
libria, and this property describes why G may possess many equilibria in general. However,
by Proposition 5, all such equilibria are payoff-wise dominated, and if ci(s) ≥ 0 for all
s ∈ S , i ∈ N , they can be eliminated from consideration when we search for a best equi-
librium. Based on this dominance, we may restrict our search to maximal equilibria and
develop the following optimality valid inequality for (P) if the objective function coefficients
are non-negative.
Proposition 6. (i) If ci(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N , then there exists an optimal equilib-
rium that is maximal.
(ii) If a strategy profile x̄ is an equilibrium, then the inequality
∑
s∈S 1(x̄)




is satisfied by every maximal equilibrium x.
Proof. (i) Immediate from Remark 2, Proposition 5 (i), and ci(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N .
(ii) If
∑
s∈S 0(x̄) x(s) > 0, (3.7) is redundant. Otherwise,
∑
s∈S 0(x̄) x(s) = 0, implying
S 1(x) ⊆ S 1(x̄), so (3.7) cuts off an equilibrium x if and only if S 1(x) ⊂ S 1(x̄). Moreover,
if S 1(x) ⊂ S 1(x̄), then x is a non-maximal equilibrium since x̄ is an equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Given a strategy profile x̄, any strategy profile x where S 1i,nv(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x)
and S 1(x) ∩ (S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄)) ̸= ∅ for some i ∈ N , is not an equilibrium.
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Proof. Let Ξx̄ be the set of strategy profiles x̃ for which there exists an state ŝ ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∪
S 1i,v(x̄) such that:
• x̃(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S 1i,nv(x̄),
• x̃(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S 0i,nv(x̄),
• x̃(ŝ) = 1 for some ŝ ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄),
• x̃(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄)/{ŝ}.
We show that each x̃ ∈ Ξx̄ is not an equilibrium. Since ŝ ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄), there are two
non-overlapping cases on where ŝ belongs to:
Case 1) If ŝ ∈ S 1i,v(x̄), then wx̃i (s) ≥ wx̄i (s) for all s ∈ S by Proposition 4 (i). As a
result, Fi(s,w
x̃
i ) ≥ Fi(s,wx̄i ) for all s ∈ S . In particular, Fi(ŝ,wx̃i ) ≥ Fi(ŝ,wx̄i ) > ui(ŝ, 1).
Since Fi(ŝ,w
x̃
i ) > ui(ŝ, 1) and x̃(ŝ) = 1, the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is violated in
state ŝ under x̃, so it is not an equilibrium.
Case 2) If ŝ ∈ S 0i,v(x̄), then consider strategy profile x̆ defined as follows:
• x̆(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S 1i,nv(x̄),
• x̆(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S /S 1i,nv(x̄).
Therefore, x̃ and x̆ take the same value for all s ∈ S /{ŝ}. By Corollary 1, if the strategy
profile x̆ is not an equilibrium, x̃ cannot be an equilibrium since S 1(x̆) ⊆ S 1(x̃).
Suppose x̆ is an equilibrium. By Proposition 4 (i), wx̆i (s) ≥ wx̄i (s) for all s ∈ S .
Therefore, Fi(s,w
x̆
i ) ≥ Fi(s,wx̄i ) > ui(s, 1) for all s ∈ S 0i,v(x̄). In particular, Fi(ŝ,wx̆i ) >
ui(ŝ, 1). Moreover, suppose that x̃ is an equilibrium; thus w
x̃
i (s) ≥ wx̆i (s) for all s ∈ S
by Proposition 5 (i). As a result, Fi(s,w
x̃
i ) ≥ Fi(s,wx̆i ) for all s ∈ S . In particular,
Fi(ŝ,w
x̃
i ) ≥ Fi(ŝ,wx̆i ) > ui(ŝ, 1), and this means that the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is
violated in state ŝ under x̃. Therefore, x̃ is not an equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
So far, we have shown that each x̃ ∈ Ξx̄ is not an equilibrium. For any strategy profile
x, satisfying the conditions of Proposition 7, there exists a strategy profile x̃ ∈ Ξx̄ such that
S 1(x̃) ⊆ S 1(x), so x cannot be an equilibrium by Corollary 1.
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An interesting feature of Proposition 7 is that it can provide insights about equilibria
irrespective of whether strategy profile x̄ is an equilibrium or not.
Proposition 8. Given a strategy profile x̄, the following inequalities are valid for Ψ.
∑
s∈S 0i,v(x̄)∪S 1i,v(x̄)
x(s) ≤ (|S 0i,v(x̄)|+ |S 1i,v(x̄)|)
∑
s∈S 1i,nv(x̄)








[1 − x(s)] = 0. This implies S 1i,nv(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x). If x is an equilibrium and
S 1i,nv(x̄) ⊆ S 1(x), then S 1(x)∩ (S 0i,v(x̄)∪S 1i,v(x̄)) = ∅ by Proposition 7. This is equivalent
to saying that if x is an equilibrium and
∑
s∈S 1i,nv(x̄)
[1 − x(s)] = 0, then x(s) = 0 for all
s ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄).
The valid inequalities given in (3.8) remove the set of strategy profiles that are not
equilibria by Proposition 7. In fact, Proposition 7 implies the following logical disjunction:
either x(s) = 1 for all s ∈ S 1i,nv(x̄), x(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S 0i,v(x̄) ∩ S 1i,v(x̄), or x(s) = 0 for
some s ∈ S 1i,nv(x̄). Although there are other valid inequalities that may ensure the logical
disjunction, by following arguments similar to those of Balas (1979), it can be shown that
(3.8) is a best disjunctive valid inequality in the sense that the amount by which x̄ violates
the valid inequality, is maximized by (3.8) among all disjunctive valid inequalities. Another
advantage of Proposition 8 is that for each player i ∈ N where S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄) ̸= ∅, we
can derive a nontrivial valid inequality.
We conclude this section by describing how our approach may be extended to establish
structures of stationary equilibria in other classes of stochastic games. In Markov decision
processes (MDPs), value iteration is often adopted to establish structural properties of the
optimal value function and the optimal stationary policy. Apart from insights behind the
derived properties, they are sometimes applied to develop a method to compute the op-
timal value function, especially in approximate dynamic programming (cf. Powell 2007).
Although stochastic games may be viewed as a multi-player generalization of MDPs, there
is no analogue of value iteration for discounted stochastic games. Consequently, there have
been only a few characterizations of stationary equilibria for stochastic games aside from
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the well-known Bellman-Shapley equations. An important consequence of Propositions 4, 5,
and 7 is that in the cost of providing the payoff profile of a given strategy profile, we can
characterize the payoff profile and equilibrium behavior of a set of strategy profiles. Our
results are the first combinatorial characterizations for a class of stochastic games, and it
is anticipated that this approach opens the door to analyze stationary equilibria of more
complicated stochastic games.
3.6 EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION FORMULATION
In this section, we present an MILP formulation for (P). Let coefficient Vi(s) be an upper
bound for equilibria payoffs of player i in state s. Kurt et al. (2011) suggest that for each
player i ∈ N , Vi := ⟨Vi(s)⟩s∈S may be calculated as a solution of the MDP equations
Vi(s) = max{ui(s, 1), Fi(s,Vi)} for all s ∈ S , and show it is a valid upper bound as it
represents optimal value function of player i in an MDP where he is maximizing his own
payoffs when the autonomy of the other players is suppressed. By using this set of parameters,
they propose an MILP to represent the set of equilibria of G, relying on the assumption that
ui(s, 0), ui(s, 1) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N . Let d := ⟨di(s)⟩s∈S ,i∈N be the payoff profile
of the strategy profile 0. In words, di(s) represents the total expected discounted reward
of player i starting from state s when he always decides to continue. We propose a similar
formulation to represent the set of equilibria of G in the following:
wi(s) ≥ Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.9a)
wi(s) ≤ Fi(s,wi) + [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x(s) ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.9b)
wi(s) ≥ [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x(s) + di(s) ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.9c)
wi(s) ≤ ui(s, 1)x(s) + Fi(s,Vi)[1− x(s)] ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.9d)
wi(s) unrestricted ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.9e)
x(s) ∈ {0, 1} ∀s ∈ S . (3.9f)
Let ∆ := {⟨x,w⟩ |(3.9a)− (3.9f)}.
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Lemma 5. (i) di(s) = Fi(s,di) for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N .
(ii) If a strategy profile x is an equilibrium, then wxi (s) ≥ di(s) for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N .
(iii) If ui(s̄, 1) < di(s̄) for some s̄ ∈ S , i ∈ N , then x(s̄) = 0 for each equilibrium x.
Proof. (i) Immediate from Proposition 2 (i).
(ii) Note that S 1(0) = ∅ ⊆ S 1(x) for each equilibrium x. The result follows from
Proposition 5 (i).
(iii) Substituting 0 for x̄ in Proposition 8 implies that the following set of inequalities
are valid for Ψ.
∑
s∈S 0i,v(0)∪S 1i,v(0)
x(s) ≤ (|S 0i,v(0)|+ |S 1i,v(0)|)
∑
s∈S 1i,nv(0)
[1− x(s)] = 0 ∀i ∈ N ,
where we have made use of the fact that S 1i,nv(0) ⊆ S 1(0) = ∅, to write the equality. Note
that s̄ ∈ S 0i,v(0) since ui(s̄, 1) < di(s̄). By the above set of inequalities, x(s̄) = 0 is valid for
Ψ, and hence x(s̄) = 0 for each equilibrium x.
Proposition 9. (i) ⟨x,w⟩ ∈ ∆ if and only if strategy profile x is an equilibrium with
associated payoff profile w.
(ii) If ui(s, 0), ui(s, 1) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N , then ∆ is at least as strong as the
formulation of Kurt et al. (2011).
Proof. (i) (⇒) x ∈ B|S | by (3.9f). For each s ∈ S , there are two cases:
If x(s) = 0, wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) for all i ∈ N by (3.9a)− (3.9b).
If x(s) = 1, wi(s) = ui(s, 1) for all i ∈ N by (3.9c)− (3.9d).
As a result, w is associated payoff profile of x by Proposition 2 (i). It also follows from
(3.9a) that the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is satisfied for all s ∈ S 1(x). Therefore, x
is an equilibrium by Proposition 2 (ii).
(⇐) Suppose x is an equilibrium with associated payoff profile w. Constraint (3.9f) is
satisfied since x is a (pure) strategy profile. Constraint (3.9a) is satisfied by Proposition 2
(ii). For each s ∈ S , there are two cases:
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If x(s) = 0, then wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) by Proposition 2 (i). Constraint (3.9b) is obviously
satisfied, and (3.9c) is satisfied by Lemma 5 (ii). Constraint (3.9d) is satisfied since:
wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) ≤ Fi(s,Vi),
where the inequality follows from the definition of Vi.
If x(s) = 1, then wi(s) = ui(s, 1) by Proposition 2 (i). Constraint (3.9b) is satisfied since:
wi(s) = ui(s, 1) ≤ ui(s, 1) + Fi(s,wi)− Fi(s,di) = ui(s, 1) + Fi(s,wi)− di(s),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5 (ii), and the second equality follows from
Lemma 5 (i). Constraints (3.9c)− (3.9d) are obviously satisfied.
(ii) If ui(s, 0), ui(s, 1) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N , it can easily be shown by value iteration
that di(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N . The rest of the proof is straightforward.
Proposition 9 (i) implies that Ψ is the projection of ∆ onto the x-space and (P) may be





s.t. ⟨x,w⟩ ∈ ∆. (3.10b)
51
3.7 ALGORITHMIC APPROACH
In this section we develop an algorithm to solve (P) efficiently. Problem (P) has a so-called
“block-ladder” structure where x are the linking variables, and is amenable to Benders’ de-
composition (Benders 1962). However, our computational experiments in Tables 7− 9 show
that even a state-of-the-art implementation of Benders’ decomposition (Fischetti et al. 2010)
is ineffective. In this section, our goal is to develop a cutting plane approach for solving (P).
Let θi be an artificial variable that approximates
∑
s∈S
ci(s)wi(s) for any i ∈ N , and let
θ := ⟨θi⟩i∈N . Furthermore, RMP , LB, UB,xincum, and ϵ are the restricted master problem,
lower bound, upper bound, the incumbent solution, and a termination tolerance, respectively.
Decomposition Algorithm








ci(s)Vi(s) ∀i ∈ N , (3.11b)
θi unrestricted ∀i ∈ N , (3.11c)
x(s) ∈ {0, 1} ∀s ∈ S . (3.11d)
1. Restricted Master: Solve RMP and obtain an optimal solution (x̄, θ̄), and let UB :=∑
i∈N θ̄i.
2. Separation:
a. Calculate payoff profilewx̄ associated with x̄ using Proposition 2 (i), and characterize






i,nv(x̄) for all i ∈ N .
b. For any i for which S 0i,v(x̄) ∪ S 1i,v(x̄) ̸= ∅, add the valid inequality (3.8) to RMP .






some i ∈ N , then 1. Add a Benders’ optimality cut (Benders 1962) to RMP for





i (s); 2. Add the valid inequality (3.7) to RMP if
ci(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N ; 3. If c⊤wx̄ ≥ LB, let xincum := x̄, LB := c⊤wx̄.
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3. Termination: If UB−LB ≤ ϵ, then terminate the algorithm. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
If x̄ is not an equilibrium, there exists some i ∈ N such that S 1i,v(x̄) ̸= ∅, and hence
(3.8) cuts off x̄ in Step (b). Hence, the Decomposition Algorithm finitely converges for
any ϵ ∈ R+. There are several differences between our proposed algorithm and Benders’
decomposition: First, we solve the set of equations (3.3) as the subproblem. Second, we use
a combinatorial feasibility cut. Third, we use a combinatorial optimality cut in addition to
a Benders’ optimality cut.
In order to calculate wx̄i in Step (a) for each i ∈ N , by Proposition 2 (i) we solve the





s.t. wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ S 0(x̄),
wi(s) = ui(s, 1) ∀s ∈ S 1(x̄),
wi(s) unrestricted ∀s ∈ S .
For each i ∈ N , let γi(s) be optimal dual multipliers of Ri(x̄) for all s ∈ S and y+ :=
max{0, y} for any y ∈ R. To enhance the Decomposition Algorithm, we seek a Pareto-
optimal Benders’ optimality cut (Magnanti and Wong 1981).











γi(s) (ui(s, 1)x(s) + Fi(s,Vi)[1− x(s)]) ∀i ∈ N . (3.12)
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Proof. Let Pi(x̄) denote the subproblem associated with each player i in (3.10a) − (3.10b)





s.t. wi(s) ≥ Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ S ,
wi(s) ≤ Fi(s,wi) + [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x̄(s) ∀s ∈ S ,
wi(s) ≥ [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x̄(s) + di(s) ∀s ∈ S ,
wi(s) ≤ ui(s, 1)x̄(s) + Fi(s,Vi)[1− x̄(s)] ∀s ∈ S ,
wi(s) unrestricted ∀s ∈ S .
In order to generate a Benders’ optimality cut in Step (c), optimal dual multipliers of Pi(x̄)
are needed while we only know optimal dual multipliers of Ri(x̄). In fact, optimal dual
multipliers ofRi(x̄) and Pi(x̄) are closely related. Let πi,1(s), πi,2(s), πi,3(s), πi,4(s) be optimal
dual multipliers of Pi(x̄) associated with equations (3.9a) − (3.9d), for all s ∈ S , i ∈ N ,
respectively. It can easily be seen that for all i ∈ N :
πi,1(s) = πi,2(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S 1(x̄), (3.13a)
πi,1(s) + πi,2(s) = γi(s) ∀s ∈ S 0(x̄), (3.13b)
πi,3(s) = πi,4(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S 0(x̄), (3.13c)
πi,3(s) + πi,4(s) = γi(s) ∀s ∈ S 1(x̄), (3.13d)
πi,1(s) ≤ 0, πi,2(s) ≥ 0, πi,3(s) ≤ 0, πi,4(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S . (3.13e)
At each iteration of the Decomposition Algorithm, Ri(x̄) is solved, and γi(s) is obtained for
all s ∈ S , i ∈ N . There are multiple dual optimal solutions for Pi(x̄), and we may use any
πi,1(s), πi,2(s), πi,3(s), πi,4(s), satisfying (3.13a) − (3.13e), to generate a Benders’ optimality




πi,1(s)ui(s, 0) + πi,2(s)
(









ui(s, 1)x(s) + Fi(s,Vi)[1− x(s)]
)
∀i ∈ N .
(3.14)
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Since Ri(x̄) is not degenerate, ⟨γi(s)⟩s∈S is the unique dual solution of Ri(x̄) . In order to







for all s ∈ S such that they minimize the term on the right-hand side of (3.14) sub-
ject to (3.13a) − (3.13e) for each equilibrium x. The right-hand side of (3.14) subject to
(3.13a)− (3.13e) may be rewritten as follows:
∑
s∈S
πi,1(s)ui(s, 0) + πi,2(s)
(













[πi,1(s) + πi,2(s)]ui(s, 0) + πi,2(s) [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x(s)+
∑
s∈S 1(x̄)
[πi,3(s) + πi,4(s)]ui(s, 1)x(s) + [πi,3(s) di(s) + πi,4(s)Fi(s,Vi)][1− x(s)] =
∑
sS 0(x̄)
γi(s)ui(s, 0) + πi,2(s) [ui(s, 1)− di(s)]x(s)+
∑
s∈S 1(x̄)
γi(s)ui(s, 1)x(s) + [πi,3(s) di(s) + πi,4(s)Fi(s,Vi)][1− x(s)], (3.15)
where the first and second equality follow from (3.13a), (3.13c) and (3.13b), (3.13d), respec-
tively. In order to minimize (3.15) subject to (3.13a) − (3.13e), we may seek to minimize
(3.15) for each s ∈ S separately. There are three cases:
If s ∈ S 0(x̄) and ui(s, 1) ≥ di(s), then π∗i,1(s) := 0, π∗i,2(s) := γi(s), π∗i,3(s) := 0, π∗i,4(s) := 0
minimizes (3.15) subject to (3.13a)− (3.13e).
If s ∈ S 0(x̄) and ui(s, 1) < di(s), then x(s) is equal to 0 for any equilibrium x by Lemma
5. As a result, π∗i,1(s) := γi(s), π
∗
i,2(s) := 0, π
∗
i,3(s) := 0, π
∗
i,4(s) := 0 minimizes (3.15) subject
to (3.13a)− (3.13e).
If s ∈ S 1(x̄), then π∗i,1(s) := 0, π∗i,2(s) := 0, π∗i,3(s) := 0, π∗i,4(s) := γi(s) minimizes (3.15)
subject to (3.13a)− (3.13e) since Fi(s,Vi) ≥ Fi(s,di) = di(s).
It is worth noting that the cut (3.12) requires only optimal dual multipliers of Ri(x̄).
Moreover, we solve the following separation problem in Step 2 of the algorithm: Given
an integral feasible point (x̄, θ̄), generate a valid inequality, separating the point from the
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convex hull of the master problem. The computational complexity of this separation problem
is clearly polynomial since x̄ is integral.
3.7.1 Branch-and-Cut
In the Decomposition Algorithm, we need to solve the restricted master problem repeatedly.
However, solving a mixed-integer restricted master repeatedly may be time-consuming. In
order to deal with this difficulty, we use a branch-and-cut framework. At the root node,
we start with the MILP in Step 0 of the Decomposition Algorithm. Then, we solve the
LP relaxation at each node and generate a violated cut at each integral node by using the
separation procedure described in Step 2 of the Decomposition Algorithm. We use the default
branching and node selection strategies of the MILP solver, ILOG-CPLEX 12.4 (2012).
Dynamic Variable Fixing and Pruning. At node t of the branch and cut tree, let
Jkt be the set of all states in which x(s) is fixed to k, for any k = {0, 1}. A strategy profile
xt := ⟨xt(s)⟩s∈S can be assigned to each node t as follows:
xt(s) =
 1 if s ∈ J1t ,0 otherwise.
If xt is not an equilibrium, node t is pruned because all possible strategy profiles at this
node (admissible with respect to the binary variables being fixed so far) are not equilibria
by Corollary 1. On the other hand, if xt is an equilibrium, we can apply Proposition 8 to fix
some of unfixed binary variables at node t and its offspring. For this reason, x(s) is set to 0
at node t for all s ∈ ∪i∈N S 0i,v(xt).
Dynamic Coefficient Strengthening. Recall that ⟨Vi(s)⟩s∈S is the optimal value
function of player i when the autonomy of the other players is suppressed. The coefficient
Vi(s) may be replaced with any other upper bound of wi(s). In general, Vi(s) may be
relatively large, which weakens the LP relaxation of ∆. To address this, we dynamically
tighten upper bounds for wi(s) in progress of the branch-and-cut tree rather than using a
fixed value as an upper bound for wi(s).
At leaf node t, we can obtain a tightened upper bound of wi(s) by using the optimal
value function of player i for a certain MDP. In particular, consider an MDP in which the
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autonomy of all players except for i is suppressed, while player i is restricted to strategies
admissible with respect to the binary variables which are fixed at node t. Since the set of
fixed binary variables increases as we go down further in the search tree, the tightened upper
bound of wi(s) does not increase. Let V
t
i (s) be the tightened upper bound for wi(s) at leaf
node t. For each player i, Vti := ⟨V ti (s)⟩s∈S can be calculated as the unique solution of the
following MDP equations:
V ti (s) = Fi(s, V
t
i ) ∀s ∈ J0t ,
V ti (s) = ui(s, 1) ∀s ∈ J1t ,
V ti (s) = max{ui(s, 1), Fi(s,Vti)} ∀s ∈ S /J0t ∪ J1t .
Similarly, the coefficient di(s) is a lower bound for wi(s), and we may tighten it as we go
down in the search tree. At leaf node t, consider payoff profile wx
t
associated with strategy
profile xt, as defined in the previous part. As noted earlier, if xt is not an equilibrium, node
t is pruned. Otherwise, xt is an equilibrium, and by Proposition 5 (i), wx
t
i (s) is a lower
bound for wi(s) at node t and its offspring. Compared to di(s), w
xt
i (s) is a tighter lower
bound by Proposition 5. The new set of upper and lower bounds is applied to generate a
Benders’ optimality cut (3.12), which is only locally valid. Since the upper and lower bounds
get tighter as we go down further in the search tree, deeper Benders’ optimality cuts will
be generated. Needless to say, this idea should only be implemented at nodes at which we
generate a Benders’ optimality cut. The idea of coefficient strengthening has received some
recent attention in the optimization community (e.g., Qiu et al. 2014).
Dynamic Player-Aggregated Upper Bounds. In stochastic games, it is natural
to assume that the players compete in the same environment, and therefore share the same
discount factor (cf. Herings and Peeters 2004, Hörner et al. 2011). Suppose that the discount
factors are equal for all players, i.e., λi = λ for all i ∈ N . We present a family of upper
bounds for the objective function at each leaf node t. Let αi ∈ R for all i ∈ N , and
α := ⟨αi⟩i∈N . We define an aggregated MDP, Gα,t, over the state space S as follows. In
each state s ∈ S \(J0t ∪J1t ), we may decide whether to stop or continue. In each state s ∈ J1t
(J0t ), we have to stop (continue). If we decide to stop, then the MDP terminates and we
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receive a stopping reward uα(s, 1) :=
∑
i∈N
αiui(s, 1). Conversely, if we decide to continue, then
the MDP moves into a new state s′ under the Markovian transition probability P(s′|s) and
we receive an immediate continuation reward uα(s, 0) :=
∑
i∈N
αiui(s, 0). All future rewards
are discounted at rate λ. Therefore, Gα,t has the same dynamic evolution as G, but the
players’ rewards are aggregated in Gα,t and its action space is admissible with respect to the
binary variables which are fixed at node t. Similar to G, we can define strategy x and its
associated payoffs wx,α,t for Gα,t. For each strategy x with associated payoffs wx,α,t for Gα,t






i (s) ∀s ∈ S . (3.16)
Let Vα,t := ⟨V α,t(s)⟩s∈S be the optimal value function of Gα,t, which is calculated as the
unique solution of the following MDP equations:
V α,t(s) = uα(s, 0) + λ
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s)V α,t(s′) ∀s ∈ J0t ,
V α,t(s) = uα(s, 1) ∀s ∈ J1t ,
V α,t(s) = max{uα(s, 1), uα(s, 0) + λ
∑
s′∈S
P(s′|s)V α,t(s′)} ∀s ∈ S /J0t ∪ J1t .





s.t. wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ J0t , i ∈ N , (3.17b)
wi(s) ≥ Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ S /J0t , i ∈ N , (3.17c)
wi(s) = ui(s, 1) ∀s ∈ J1t , i ∈ N , (3.17d)∑
i∈N
αiwi(s) ≤ V α,t(s) ∀s ∈ S , (3.17e)
wi(s) ≤ V ti (s) ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N , (3.17f)
wi(s) unrestricted ∀s ∈ S , i ∈ N . (3.17g)
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If a strategy profile x is an equilibrium and admissible at node t, then wx satisfies (3.17b)−
(3.17d) by Proposition 2, and satisfies (3.17e) − (3.17f) by (3.16) and the definitions of
Vα,t,Vti. Hence, the following inequality is locally valid at node t and its offspring:
∑
i∈N
θi ≤ θ̄t. (3.18)
Of special interest is the case when α is equal to ei, the i
th unit vector in R|N |. In this
case, we do not need the above-mentioned assumption about equality of the discount factors,





s.t. wi(s) = Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ J0t , (3.19b)
wi(s) ≥ Fi(s,wi) ∀s ∈ S /J0t , (3.19c)
wi(s) = ui(s, 1) ∀s ∈ J1t , (3.19d)
wi(s) ≤ V ti (s) ∀s ∈ S , (3.19e)
wi(s) unrestricted ∀s ∈ S . (3.19f)
A reasoning similar to that for validity of the inequality (3.18), shows that following inequal-
ity is locally valid at node t and its offspring:
θi ≤ θ̄ti ∀i ∈ N . (3.20)
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3.8 COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
3.8.1 Implementation and Test Instances
We implemented the branch-and-cut algorithm described in Section 3.7, using the ILOG-
CPLEX 12.4 Callable Library embedded in C++ under Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. We
conducted our computational experiments on an Intel Xeon PC with 4.0 GHz CPU, 32 GB
RAM, and Windows 7 (64-bit) operating system. Each instance of our test bed was processed
three times within a 4-hour time limit: First by our implementation of the branch-and-cut
algorithm described in Section 3.7 within ILOG-CPLEX 12.4; second by solving the original
MILP model (3.10a)− (3.10b) through ILOG-CPLEX 12.4 (with default settings); and third
by our implementation of a state-of-the-art Benders’ decomposition (Fischetti et al. 2010)
within ILOG-CPLEX 12.4. In the implementation of our branch-and-cut algorithm, all cuts
are generated at integral nodes and added locally. The valid inequalities (3.18) and (3.20)
are added locally in non-integral nodes as well. Dynamic variable fixing and pruning are
implemented via a branch callback routine.
In our implementation of Benders’ decomposition, the vector x is considered as the linking
variables for the basic MILP (3.10a) − (3.10b). We adopt a branch-and-cut framework as
follows. At the root node, we start with the initial problem (3.11a)− (3.11d). At each node,
we use the constraint-generation scheme proposed by Fischetti et al. (2010) to identify a
violated constraint (if any) for each i ∈ N . When no constraint is generated at a node,
we let the default setting of ILOG-CPLEX 12.4 branch and select another node (if any)
to explore. All generated constraints are added globally; in our experiments there was no
significant difference compared to adding them locally.
We restrict our attention to consensus stopping game instances in which each player i ∈
N has an individual state si ∈ Si representing his competitive advantage, where Si denotes
his state space. Also, each player i ∈ N has an individual Markovian transition probability
matrix Pi, where Pi(s
′
i|si) shows the probability that player i will be in state s′i ∈ Si at the
next period given that he is now in state si ∈ Si. As a result, the game state s ∈ S is
(s1, s2, . . . , sN), and the game state space S is the Cartesian product of S1, S2, . . . , SN so
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that |S | =
∏
i∈N
|Si|. Moreover, the game transition probability matrix P is the Kronecker
product of transition probability matrices of all players, i.e, P(s′1, . . . , s
′




i|si). Clearly, the equilibrium selection MILP grows rapidly as either the number
of players or the size of Si increases. For each instance, there is an initial state, denoted
by ŝ, and the objective function (3.10a) is set to
∑
i∈N
wi(ŝ). This is a reasonable objective
since it is the sum of all players’ expected reward-to-go from the initial state. Moreover, the
discount factors are equal for all players, and hence we use both valid inequalities (3.18) and
(3.20) in the branch-and-cut algorithm. In computation of the valid inequality (3.18), we let
α ∈ R|N | be a vector whose components are all equal to 1.
In order to enhance the performance, we provide all approaches with strategy profiles
x̄1, x̄2 as a warm start such that for each s ∈ S ,
x̄1(s) =
 1 if s = ŝ,0 otherwise, x̄2(s) =
 1 if Vi(s) = ui(s, 1)∀i ∈ N ,0 otherwise.
Proposition 11. Strategy profile x̄2 is an equilibrium.
Proof. If s ∈ S 0(x̄2), the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is obviously satisfied for all i ∈ N .
Conversely, if s ∈ S 1(x̄2), then
wx̄2i (s) = ui(s, 1) = Vi(s) ≥ Fi(s,Vi) ≥ Fi(s,w
x̄2
i ) ∀i ∈ N ,
where the first equality follows from Proposition 2 (i), the second equality follows from the
definition of x̄2, and the first and second inequalities follow from the definition of Vi. Hence,
the Bellman-Shapley equation (3.4) is satisfied for all s ∈ S 1(x̄2), i ∈ N .
By Proposition 11, strategy profile x̄2 is an equilibrium. However, x̄1 is not necessarily
an equilibrium, and in such a case it is automatically eliminated from consideration by the
MILP solver.
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3.8.2 Computational Results 1: Real Clinical Instances
We used the method described in Kurt et al. (2011) to generate three categories of consensus
stopping game instances for their kidney exchange problem. In the first (second) category,
there are two players such that the size of Si is equal to 40 (60) for both players. In the
third category, there are three players, and |Si| = 15 for all players.
Tables 7 − 9 include computational results for the first, second, and third category of
instances, respectively. In these tables, we report the number of cuts, number of explored
nodes, the best solution, optimality gap (%), and running time (in the hour: minute: second
time format) for all approaches. Moreover, let Branch-and-Cut refer to the branch-and-
cut algorithm described in Section 3.7, CPLEX refer to solving the original MILP model
(3.10a)− (3.10b) through ILOG-CPLEX 12.4, and Benders refer to the state-of-the-art Ben-
ders’ decomposition (Fischetti et al. 2010). We also sorted the instances in the tables with
respect to the optimality gap of Branch-and-Cut, CPLEX, and Benders, respectively. ILOG-
CPLEX 12.4 does not generate any internal cuts for Branch-and-Cut, and all cuts used to
solve the three categories of instances by Branch-and-Cut are the cuts described in Section
3.7.
In Table 7, both Branch-and-Cut and CPLEX can solve instances a1− a10. On the ma-
jority of these instances, Branch-and-Cut is several orders of magnitude faster than CPLEX.
Branch-and-Cut needs about 15 minutes total to solve all instances of this subset while
CPLEX needs almost 4.5 hours total, i.e., Branch-and-Cut is 18 times faster in processing
the whole set. Branch-and-Cut can solve each instance of a11 − a18 in less than 19 min-
utes while CPLEX cannot solve any of them. Neither Branch-and-Cut nor CPLEX is able
to solve instances a19 − a30. However, Branch-and-Cut provides smaller optimality gaps
for all instances. Overall, Branch-and-Cut outperforms CPLEX on all instances. It is also
worth noting that the optimality gap of Benders is larger than that of Branch-and-Cut and
CPLEX on all instances. In some instances, we observe that the number of explored nodes
and the optimality gap are 0, meaning that those instances are solved at the root node.
In such instances, x̄1 is an optimal solution which was provided for the three solution ap-
proaches through the warm start; however, establishing optimality can be very challenging,
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Table 7: Two player with 40 state-per-player instances, sorted with respect to the optimality















cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s)
a1 31 0 11954.3 0.00 0:08:21 0 0 11954.3 0.00 0:27:23 54 3 11954.3 0.00 1:00:25
a2 0 0 11684.2 0.00 0:00:01 1380 0 11684.2 0.00 1:36:08 0 0 11684.2 0.00 0:00:01
a3 31 0 11472.6 0.00 0:01:45 0 0 11472.6 0.00 0:19:12 17 0 11472.6 0.00 0:14:19
a4 0 0 13057.1 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 13057.1 0.00 0:05:47 0 0 13057.1 0.00 0:00:01
a5 0 0 11230.3 0.00 0:00:01 1350 0 11230.3 0.00 2:16:39 0 0 11230.3 0.00 0:00:01
a6 0 0 11765 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11765 0.00 0:05:53 0 0 11765 0.00 0:00:01
a7 0 0 11840.4 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11840.4 0.00 0:02:23 0 0 11840.4 0.00 0:00:01
a8 25 0 12125.8 0.00 0:01:37 0 0 12125.8 0.00 0:36:51 125 0 12125.8 1.05 4:00:00
a9 13 0 13309.1 0.00 0:01:20 0 0 13309.1 0.00 2:28:57 115 0 13309.1 2.96 4:00:00
a10 15 0 11648.1 0.00 0:01:47 0 0 11648.1 0.00 0:49:55 141 0 11648.1 4.85 4:00:00
a11 19 0 11045.8 0.00 0:01:29 1707 0 11045.8 0.12 4:00:00 149 1 11045.8 2.60 4:00:00
a12 21 0 11682.5 0.00 0:01:32 1639 20 11682.5 0.53 4:00:00 150 1 11682.5 2.32 4:00:00
a13 10 0 10429.5 0.00 0:04:32 1513 81 10429.5 0.96 4:00:00 169 1 10429.5 7.55 4:00:00
a14 592 0 11833.3 0.00 0:18:10 1321 24 11833.3 1.43 4:00:00 197 1 11833.3 3.69 4:00:00
a15 14 0 11911.5 0.00 0:01:27 1883 327 11911.5 2.73 4:00:00 154 1 11911.5 3.64 4:00:00
a16 139 0 11540.9 0.00 0:05:10 1416 152 11540.9 2.93 4:00:00 260 0 11540.9 4.74 4:00:00
a17 25 0 11395.2 0.00 0:01:37 1498 17 11395.2 3.19 4:00:00 942 1 11395.2 4.79 4:00:00
a18 12 0 11447 0.00 0:01:20 1849 2 11447 3.71 4:00:00 158 0 11447 6.88 4:00:00
a19 1394 277 12096.9 0.36 4:00:00 1834 0 12096.9 5.23 4:00:00 132 0 12096.9 6.51 4:00:00
a20 726 163 13190 2.31 4:00:00 0 0 13124.2 6.67 4:00:00 144 0 13124.2 6.80 4:00:00
a21 851 161 12286.7 2.54 4:00:00 1509 97 12276.2 3.60 4:00:00 118 0 12276.2 12.33 4:00:00
a22 884 162 12297.7 2.58 4:00:00 1520 71 12226 4.22 4:00:00 166 0 12226 10.34 4:00:00
a23 938 167 11769.6 2.72 4:00:00 1623 43 11619 4.79 4:00:00 428 0 11619 13.22 4:00:00
a24 799 181 11990.3 2.90 4:00:00 1655 400 11901.7 4.23 4:00:00 252 0 11901.7 13.80 4:00:00
a25 759 172 10961.2 3.47 4:00:00 1147 128 10940.4 5.22 4:00:00 451861 10940.4 13.89 4:00:00
a26 836 185 10315.6 3.49 4:00:00 897 278 10264.7 6.84 4:00:00 223 1 10264.7 12.88 4:00:00
a27 719 164 11957.8 3.49 4:00:00 1560 70 11937.8 5.97 4:00:00 152 0 11937.8 12.38 4:00:00
a28 796 162 11544.9 4.25 4:00:00 1919 38 11521.1 7.71 4:00:00 214 1 11521.1 12.35 4:00:00
a29 815 176 9083.38 4.40 4:00:00 840 607 9052.69 4.74 4:00:00 148 1 9046.38 19.99 4:00:00
a30 802 194 11599.7 5.73 4:00:00 1301 30 11558.7 8.59 4:00:00 2 0 11558.7 12.36 4:00:00
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Table 8: Two player with 60 state-per-player instances, sorted with respect to the optimality















cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s)
b1 0 0 11736.6 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11736.6 0.00 1:02:43 0 0 11736.6 0.00 0:00:01
b2 0 0 11821 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11821 0.00 0:54:41 0 0 11821 0.00 0:00:01
b3 0 0 11699.1 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11699.1 0.00 1:00:08 0 0 11699.1 0.00 0:00:01
b4 0 0 11189.1 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11189.1 0.00 0:36:11 0 0 11189.1 0.00 0:00:01
b5 0 0 13358.9 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 13358.9 0.00 0:31:29 0 0 13358.9 0.00 0:00:01
b6 0 0 11540.9 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11540.9 0.00 0:35:40 0 0 11540.9 0.00 0:00:01
b7 0 0 11699.1 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 11699.1 0.00 1:05:26 0 0 11699.1 0.00 0:00:01
b8 18 0 10823 0.00 0:20:22 0 0 10823 0.00 3:01:31 11 0 10823 0.00 4:00:00
b9 26 0 11163.8 0.00 0:29:02 81 0 11163.8 0.00 3:02:01 203 0 11163.8 1.20 4:00:00
b10 32 0 10593 0.00 0:34:33 0 0 10593 +∞ 4:00:00 46 0 10593 0.31 4:00:00
b11 4 0 12049.7 0.00 0:02:03 0 0 12049.7 +∞ 4:00:00 44 0 12049.7 0.55 4:00:00
b12 14 0 11627.7 0.00 0:49:29 0 0 11627.7 +∞ 4:00:00 48 0 11627.7 0.55 4:00:00
b13 104 0 12071.5 0.00 1:10:28 0 0 12071.5 +∞ 4:00:00 61 0 12071.5 1.77 4:00:00
b14 123 0 11304.7 0.00 0:58:54 0 0 11304.7 +∞ 4:00:00 92 1 11304.7 2.62 4:00:00
b15 15 0 11117.6 0.00 0:40:21 0 0 11117.6 +∞ 4:00:00 74 1 11117.6 3.75 4:00:00
b16 19 0 11964.8 0.00 0:38:07 0 0 11964.8 +∞ 4:00:00 65 0 11964.8 4.36 4:00:00
b17 172 0 11466.9 0.00 1:19:53 0 0 11466.9 +∞ 4:00:00 84 0 11466.9 5.64 4:00:00
b18 25 0 11014.6 0.00 0:21:51 0 0 11014.6 +∞ 4:00:00 86 0 11014.6 6.14 4:00:00
b19 35 0 10352.7 0.00 0:46:17 0 0 10352.7 +∞ 4:00:00 96 1 10352.7 7.01 4:00:00
b20 295 10 12287.9 0.16 4:00:00 0 0 12287.9 +∞ 4:00:00 88 1 12287.9 2.72 4:00:00
b21 60 10 11831.1 1.06 4:00:00 0 0 11831.1 +∞ 4:00:00 126 1 11831.1 7.31 4:00:00
b22 63 10 11623.6 2.33 4:00:00 0 0 11623.6 +∞ 4:00:00 120 0 11623.6 9.94 4:00:00
b23 83 10 11736.2 2.92 4:00:00 0 0 11598.9 +∞ 4:00:00 122 1 11598.9 14.29 4:00:00
b24 61 10 10959.8 3.48 4:00:00 0 0 10959.8 +∞ 4:00:00 122 1 10959.8 11.28 4:00:00
b25 81 10 9621.96 3.56 4:00:00 0 0 9606.76 +∞ 4:00:00 97 0 9606.76 30.19 4:00:00
b26 92 10 9712.26 3.57 4:00:00 0 0 9709.84 4.65 4:00:00 108 0 9709.84 31.09 4:00:00
b27 69 10 9996.52 4.40 4:00:00 3894 0 9991.23 5.79 4:00:00 115 0 9991.23 22.37 4:00:00
b28 72 10 10149.9 6.02 4:00:00 0 0 10089.9 +∞ 4:00:00 79 1 10089.9 22.94 4:00:00
b29 70 10 7982.41 6.09 4:00:00 0 0 7961.32 +∞ 4:00:00 31 0 7961.32 29.99 4:00:00
b30 204 10 9873.91 10.07 4:00:00 0 0 9852.2 14.08 4:00:00 126 1 9852.2 19.76 4:00:00
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Table 9: Three player with 15 state-per-player instances, sorted with respect to the optimality















cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s)
c1 0 0 16647 0.00 0:00:00 0 0 16647 0.00 0:04:50 0 0 16647 0.00 0:00:01
c2 0 0 18230.9 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 18230.9 0.00 0:04:19 0 0 18230.9 0.00 0:00:01
c3 219 0 17088.9 0.00 0:50:08 0 0 17088.9 0.00 1:00:09 558 0 17088.9 1.78 4:00:00
c4 30 0 17862.1 0.00 0:09:42 0 0 17862.1 0.00 0:33:57 830 0 17862.1 3.85 4:00:00
c5 26 0 15437 0.00 0:09:32 0 0 15437 0.00 0:35:43 969 0 15437 4.92 4:00:00
c6 26 0 16345.6 0.00 0:09:35 0 0 16345.6 0.00 1:46:15 435 0 16345.6 6.42 4:00:00
c7 317 0 17582 0.00 1:11:43 0 0 17582 0.70 4:00:00 92 0 17582 0.98 4:00:00
c8 194 0 16176 0.00 0:44:55 0 0 16176 1.34 4:00:00 195 0 16176 2.28 4:00:00
c9 110 0 16919.5 0.00 0:27:48 0 0 16919.5 +∞ 4:00:00 267 0 16919.5 1.11 4:00:00
c10 152 0 17886.8 0.00 0:36:09 0 0 17886.8 +∞ 4:00:00 196 0 17886.8 1.24 4:00:00
c11 80 0 17638.8 0.00 0:21:09 0 0 17638.8 +∞ 4:00:00 121 0 17638.8 1.60 4:00:00
c12 89 0 17802.4 0.00 0:22:40 0 0 17802.4 +∞ 4:00:00 267 0 17802.4 1.73 4:00:00
c13 213 0 16755.1 0.00 1:08:11 0 0 16755.1 +∞ 4:00:00 405 0 16755.1 1.99 4:00:00
c14 275 0 17251.9 0.00 1:02:46 0 0 17251.9 +∞ 4:00:00 154 0 17251.9 2.34 4:00:00
c15 209 0 17528.5 0.00 0:47:55 0 0 17528.5 +∞ 4:00:00 285 0 17528.5 3.25 4:00:00
c16 695 40 17817.3 0.51 4:00:00 0 0 17817.3 +∞ 4:00:00 141 0 17817.3 6.42 4:00:00
c17 288 40 18735.5 0.59 4:00:00 1646 0 18700.1 0.70 4:00:00 624 0 18692.3 10.39 4:00:00
c18 983 0 17362.6 0.69 4:00:00 0 0 17362.6 +∞ 4:00:00 152 0 17362.6 1.54 4:00:00
c19 486 40 15703.3 0.95 4:00:00 0 0 15681.5 +∞ 4:00:00 651 0 15677 18.04 4:00:00
c20 397 29 16926 1.35 4:00:00 2375 0 16909.6 1.35 4:00:00 564 0 16900.7 12.48 4:00:00
c21 290 40 11975.8 2.19 4:00:00 254 17 11514.2 5.16 4:00:00 621 0 11508.1 43.85 4:00:00
c22 253 40 14279.6 2.22 4:00:00 2814 0 14109.9 3.18 4:00:00 420 0 14094.7 33.47 4:00:00
c23 309 40 15946.9 3.21 4:00:00 1270 0 15908.4 3.55 4:00:00 465 0 15871.2 14.90 4:00:00
c24 886 23 13783.7 3.30 4:00:00 2542 0 13783.7 3.00 4:00:00 315 0 13776.8 33.55 4:00:00
c25 293 40 12439.3 3.93 4:00:00 243 100 12628 1.29 4:00:00 564 0 12295.4 43.47 4:00:00
c26 522 40 15158.6 5.27 4:00:00 2576 0 15141.9 5.60 4:00:00 240 0 15100.6 21.07 4:00:00
c27 507 34 15227.8 5.42 4:00:00 2015 0 14842.6 7.77 4:00:00 378 0 14793.1 29.00 4:00:00
c28 681 31 17215.1 6.66 4:00:00 3163 0 17215.1 7.86 4:00:00 204 0 17174 14.60 4:00:00
c29 349 40 12859.5 11.63 4:00:00 852 0 12457.7 13.48 4:00:00 771 0 12416.1 49.68 4:00:00
c30 303 40 12828.7 16.51 4:00:00 1622 0 12828.7 17.44 4:00:00 228 0 12740.1 39.02 4:00:00
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e.g., instances a11−a18. Moreover, we observe that Branch-and-Cut and Benders solve some
instances without adding any cut at the root node, meaning that the inequalities (3.11b)
are enough to close the optimality gap. CPLEX also solves some instances without adding
any cut at the root node by preprocessing and probing techniques. For instances a20− a30,
no warm-start solution is optimal. For these instances, finding a better solution than the
warm-start solution x̄2 is quite challenging, and CPLEX is unable to find a better solution
while Branch-and-Cut is able to find better solutions and provides smaller optimality gaps.
Moreover, we let CPLEX explore these instances in a 24-hour time limit, and observed that
CPLEX was only able to find a better solution for half of them, and its performance in terms
of optimality gap was dominated by that of Branch-and-Cut for a 4-hour time limit.
Table 8 shows a similar pattern. Both Branch-and-Cut and CPLEX can solve instances
b1 − b9, and Branch-and-Cut is several orders of magnitude faster than CPLEX. Branch-
and-Cut can solve instances b10−b19 while CPLEX cannot solve any of them. The situation
for CPLEX is even worse since it is unable to solve even the LP relaxation and find a bound
for these instances. We attempted to tune CPLEX by adjusting the pricing strategy of the
LP solver, the algorithm used for the LP solver, and the primal heuristic, but this had little
effect. Instances b20 − b30 cannot be solved by Branch-and-Cut nor by CPLEX. However,
Branch-and-Cut provides us with better solutions and smaller optimality gaps. For most
of instances b20 − b30, CPLEX is unable to solve even the LP relaxation, and tuning of
CPLEX parameters had little effect just as that for instances b10 − b19. For instances of
b1−b19, x̄1 is optimal, and establishing optimality is the primary challenge in which Branch-
and-Cut does remarkably well. In fact, for instances b15 − b19, CPLEX cannot close the
optimality gap even in a week. For instances b20− b30, both finding a better solution than
x̄2 and establishing optimality are extremely challenging. For (almost) all of these instances,
CPLEX is unable to find a better solution than x̄2 even within (one week) one day, and its
optimality gap is still larger than that of Branch-and-Cut for a 4-hour time limit. Generally
speaking, the advantage of Branch-and-Cut over CPLEX is even more apparent with the
larger instances. Moreover, Benders outperforms CPLEX in the majority of the instances
of Table 8 within the time limit. However, it too is dominated by Branch-and-Cut on all
instances. Table 9 shows that Branch-and-Cut outperforms the other solution approaches.
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Table 10: Performance of Branch-and-Cut when each type of valid inequality is deactivated.
Original Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
Branch-and-Cut (3.7) (3.8) (3.12) (3.18) (3.20)
Instances Number of solved problems 18 18 18 18 8 18
of Table Average of gap (%) 1.27 1.30 1.46 1.37 2.57 1.28
Instances Number of solved problems 19 19 19 19 10 17
of Table Average of gap (%) 1.45 1.45 1.55 1.53 2.65 1.70
Instances Number of solved problems 15 15 16 16 3 15
of Table Average of gap (%) 2.14 2.19 2.67 2.57 3.05 2.21
In order to evaluate efficiency of the five families of valid inequalities applied in Branch-
and-Cut, we deactivated each type of valid inequality in Branch-and-Cut one at a time
and collected the numerical results. In Table 10, we report the number of solved problems
and average of the optimality gaps in rows 1 − 2, 3 − 4, and 5 − 6 for instances of Table
7 − 9, respectively. In column 1, we report the statistics for Branch-and-Cut. In columns
2− 6, we report the statistics for Branch-and-Cut after deactivation of the associated valid
inequalities. This table shows that the valid inequalities (3.18) and (3.20) have a significant
effect in closing the optimality gap.
3.8.3 Computational Results 2: More General Instances
All instances studied in the preceding subsection had non-negative rewards. In this sub-
section, we investigate a set of random instances including both negative and non-negative
rewards to test the computational performance of our approach under this setting. In our
synthetic test bed, each instance consists of four components: Players’ individual transi-
tion matrices, rewards, discount factors for each player, and the initial state of the game.
All these components, but discount factors, are randomly generated for two categories of
instances as follows.
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We generated two categories of two-player consensus stopping game instances. For the
first (second) category, the size of Si is equal to 40 (60) for both players. Recall from Sub-
section 3.8.1 that (1) the game state is s = (s1, s2), i.e., S = S1 × S2, and (2) the game
transition probability matrix P is the Kronecker product of the individual transition prob-
ability matrices, i.e., P(s′1, s
′
2|s1, s2) = Pi(s′1|s1)Pi(s′2|s2). In many practical applications of
consensus stopping games such as war termination and organ exchange, which were discussed
in Section 3.1, transition in state of the game is slow, i.e., the game most likely remains in
the same state at the next period as that of the current period. For this reason, we randomly
generated a set of individual transition probability matrices that are highly diagonal, i.e.,
the diagonal entries are close to 1. Specifically, in generating our transition matrices we
used the notion of increasing failure rate (IFR) property. The IFR property has its origins
in maintenance optimization and reliability literature (Barlow and Proschan 1965), but it
has been recently shown that data in varying real contexts, primarily in healthcare and ser-
vice operations, empirically exhibit IFR property (Alagoz 2004). The transition matrices
we generated are designed to be moderately sparse but do not have any diagonal entry that
is less than 0.99. Such transition matrices can be encountered in real-life dynamic settings
where decision epochs are spaced very close to each other so that leaving the state of the
system in one period is not very likely. It is also common to see sparse transition matrices
with large diagonal entries when solutions of a large-scale dynamic decision-making prob-
lem are approximated through state aggregation. To ensure our transition matrices have
the IFR property and the specified threshold probabilities in their diagonals, we simulated
their entries iteratively starting from the top row. In each particular row, we simulated the
entries from left to right in column order after randomly fixing the diagonal entry in the
specified range. All entries of the same row are generated from a uniform distribution whose
boundaries are imposed by a corresponding partial row sum from the previous row due to
the IFR property. While such order restrictions can disallow some entries to be positive,
we also allowed each nondiagonal entry to be 0 with probability 0.01. Across all transition
matrices we generated, on average, the transition matrices for 40-state-per-player instances
were 53% sparse whereas the transition matrices for 60-state-per-player instances were 63%
sparse.
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For each i ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ S , the rewards ui(s, 0) and ui(s, 1) only depend on si.
For each i ∈ {1, 2} and s ∈ {(s1, s2) ∈ S : si ̸= |Si|}, ui(s, 0) is generated according






di(s), where rand(si) is a random number from a uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. In addition, the last state (i.e., si = |Si|) is absorbing, and its continuation and
stopping rewards are 0 and −∞, respectively. Finally, the initial state of the game ŝ is





We report our computational results for the first and second categories of instances in
Tables 11 − 12, respectively. These tables illustrate that Branch-and-Cut greatly outper-
forms CPLEX and Benders. Note that CPLEX incorrectly finds many instances infeasible
or unbounded. It also removes the optimal solution for instance d2 in Table 11. We at-
tempted to circumvent these numerical failures by setting the feasibility tolerance parameter
(CPX PARAM EPRHS) to its highest allowed value (0.1), but this had little effect. There
are a couple of reasons behind these failures: (1) Large variability in the coefficients of
the formulation ∆ due to the existence of the transition probability matrix as well as the
big-M type coefficients ⟨Vi(s)⟩s∈S ,i∈N and ⟨di(s)⟩s∈S ,i∈N raises the possibility of numerical
instability. (2) For each x ∈ B|S |, if x(s) = 0 (x(s) = 1), then inequalities (3.9a) − (3.9b)
((3.9c)− (3.9d)) must hold as equalities, which are more numerically unstable.
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Best Gap Time # of #
of
Best Gap Time
cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodessolution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodessolution (%) (h:m:s)
d1 31 0 -43791.2 0.00 0:01:24 0 0 -43791.2 0.00 0:00:07 2523 0 -43791.2 0.14 4:00:00
d2 6593 173 -42298.1 0.19 4:00:00 287 0 -42315.4 0.00 0:14:16 1530 2 -42315.4 20.69 4:00:00
d3 225 0 -50115 0.00 0:06:32 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:05 1660 2 -50115 4.54 4:00:00
d4 2866 181 -43871.9 0.27 4:00:00 0 0 -44002.2 UNB 0:00:03 14372 0 -44002.2 37.37 4:00:00
d5 3149 251 -61003.2 0.01 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:04 2861 0 -61003.2 8.08 4:00:00
d6 31 0 -41204.1 0.00 0:00:43 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:03 1969 0 -41204.1 1.33 4:00:00
d7 4531 178 -40924.1 0.16 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:02 1380 1 -41415.6 16.59 4:00:00
d8 7929 318 -38364.6 0.67 4:00:00 945 0 -38414.4 0.71 4:00:00 1924 1 -38414.4 15.68 4:00:00
d9 121 0 -46703.7 0.00 0:04:20 0 0 -46703.7 UNB 0:00:02 4330 0 -46703.7 1.00 4:00:00
d10 131 0 -47275.9 0.01 0:01:43 0 0 -47277.6 0.00 0:01:26 1876 1 -47277.6 24.57 4:00:00
d11 481 17 -69717 0.01 0:20:24 0 0 -69850.1 UNB 0:00:05 2510 0 -69850.1 9.66 4:00:00
d12 113 0 -36144.2 0.00 0:05:45 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:03 5552 0 -36144.2 1.60 4:00:00
d13 1411 44 -56391.4 0.01 0:55:14 0 0 -56431.1 UNB 0:00:05 1828 0 -56431.1 10.92 4:00:00
d14 3819 242 -38651.9 0.06 4:00:00 0 0 -38672.8 UNB 0:00:05 1931 0 -38672.8 18.96 4:00:00
d15 5424 197 -55730.8 0.05 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:04 3191 1 -55919.2 11.34 4:00:00
d16 7099 315 -33109.3 0.62 4:00:00 366 0 -33621.2 2.02 4:00:00 2006 2 -33621.2 45.65 4:00:00
d17 6513 209 -60506.6 0.02 4:00:00 0 0 -62539.4 UNB 0:00:04 2446 1 -62539.4 13.17 4:00:00
d18 47 0 -55398.6 0.00 0:01:14 0 0 -55398.6 0.00 0:00:10 2682 0 -55398.6 7.29 4:00:00
d19 439 28 -49544.6 0.00 0:20:57 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:05 3142 1 -50244.9 25.84 4:00:00
d20 2104 146 -50500 0.01 1:27:08 0 0 -50662.4 UNB 0:00:03 2869 0 -50662.4 10.87 4:00:00
d21 147 0 -54442.8 0.00 0:06:21 0 0 -54442.8 0.00 0:00:07 2179 2 -54442.8 7.10 4:00:00
d22 43 0 -26155 0.00 0:03:32 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:03 355 0 -26155 4.40 4:00:00
d23 119 0 -42945.8 0.00 0:03:38 0 0 -43032.7 UNB 0:00:02 5848 1 -43032.7 20.81 4:00:00
d24 99 0 -52390.7 0.00 0:04:30 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:05 4969 0 -52390.7 5.52 4:00:00
d25 149 0 -40318 0.00 0:05:09 0 0 -40327.2 UNB 0:00:04 892 1 -40327.2 7.25 4:00:00
d26 5001 154 -74479.8 0.52 4:00:00 206 75 -74506.1 0.25 4:00:00 2138 2 -74506.1 10.14 4:00:00
d27 168 0 -50124.8 0.00 0:07:36 0 0 -54372.4 UNB 0:00:03 6163 1 -50124.8 9.00 4:00:00
d28 0 0 -47153 0.00 0:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:03 0 0 -47153 0.00 0:00:00
d29 4005 154 -71754.9 0.02 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:06 5838 0 -71972 35.42 4:00:00
d30 104 0 -32799.1 0.00 0:05:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:05 2030 0 -32799.1 6.26 4:00:00
• INF: Infeasible • UNB: Unbounded • N/A: Not applicable
70








Best Gap Time # of #
of
Best Gap Time
cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s) cuts nodes solution (%) (h:m:s)
e1 0 0 -9859.9 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 -9859.9 UNB 0:00:24 0 0 -9859.9 0.00 0:00:01
e2 62 0 -40272.1 0.00 0:57:54 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:01 200 1 -40272.1 37.51 4:00:00
e3 575 29 -16238.9 6.78 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:09 200 2 -16529.6 47.49 4:00:00
e4 0 0 5491.23 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 5491.23 0.00 0:00:22 0 0 5491.23 0.00 0:00:00
e5 1259 65 -14832.3 3.19 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:02 306 1 -17333.6 33.34 4:00:00
e6 380 11 -36677.5 7.94 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 176 1 -36887 29.06 4:00:00
e7 0 0 -16584.5 0.00 0:00:01 3846 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 0 0 -16584.5 0.00 0:00:01
e8 423 5 -21916.7 1.68 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:02 198 2 -22595.7 33.55 4:00:00
e9 383 5 -23243.7 0.20 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:23 218 1 -24911.8 57.43 4:00:00
e10 91 0 -16321.9 0.00 1:56:24 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:10 172 0 -16321.9 1.11 4:00:00
e11 416 20 -28559.8 4.38 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:10 138 0 -29452 18.11 4:00:00
e12 67 0 -8071.9 0.00 1:00:08 3864 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 193 2 -8071.9 10.69 4:00:00
e13 913 36 -23466.3 2.69 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:01 362 1 -23545.8 74.65 4:00:00
e14 34 0 -8939.3 0.00 0:34:48 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:02 171 0 -8939.3 33.58 4:00:00
e15 392 24 -9643.13 19.25 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 160 2 -10294.1 61.04 4:00:00
e16 220 0 -18861.3 0.00 2:19:10 0 0 -27315.1 +∞ 4:00:00 199 1 -18861.3 11.96 4:00:00
e17 0 0 -911.841 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:09 0 0 -911.841 0.00 0:00:00
e18 0 0 5865.58 0.00 0:00:01 3980 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 0 0 5865.58 0.00 0:00:01
e19 0 0 -4283.5 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 -4283.5 0.00 0:00:16 0 0 -4283.5 0.00 0:00:00
e20 431 13 -25861.9 5.56 4:00:00 3495 0 -27120.3 11.70 4:00:00 192 1 -27120.3 23.69 4:00:00
e21 0 0 -10039.5 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:01 0 0 -10039.5 0.00 0:00:01
e22 121 0 1717.15 0.00 2:04:38 0 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 187 1 1717.15 135.904:00:00
e23 0 0 208.367 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:09 0 0 208.367 0.00 0:00:01
e24 199 0 -9698.95 0.00 3:18:37 0 0 -17128.8 +∞ 4:00:00 222 0 -9698.95 59.03 4:00:00
e25 600 14 -15213.2 11.09 4:00:00 0 0 -19753.8 +∞ 4:00:00 190 1 -19753.8 54.39 4:00:00
e26 0 0 6784.35 0.00 0:00:01 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:02 0 0 6784.35 0.00 0:00:00
e27 0 0 8851.23 0.00 0:00:01 16 0 INF N/
A
4:00:00 0 0 8851.23 0.00 0:00:01
e28 373 12 -14376.5 17.56 4:00:00 3509 0 -14376.5 28.64 4:00:00 204 1 -14376.5 35.64 4:00:00
e29 351 7 -34220.7 0.67 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
0:00:09 158 0 -34240.8 37.86 4:00:00
e30 365 20 -39354.9 7.64 4:00:00 0 0 INF N/
A
1:45:26 180 1 -40643.6 47.62 4:00:00
• INF: Infeasible • UNB: Unbounded • N/A: Not applicable
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4.0 CHARACTERIZING ENTRY AND EXIT FOR STATIONARY
EQUILIBRIA OF A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY MODEL
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial organization is a field of economics that studies structures of firms and markets.
The computational branch of industrial organization which is connected with analyze station-
ary equilibria of stochastic games arising in industries, has received a considerable attention
since the seminal work of Ericson and Pakes (1995). However, technical difficulties related
to computability of stationary equilibria have restricted its applicability. Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite (2010) provided a more computationally tractable model of an oligopolistic
industry with investment, entry, and exit by imposing symmetry restrictions on firms’ be-
haviors. To enhance the computational tractability, we characterize entry and exit behaviors
of firms under stationary equilibria for the model of Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010)
while relaxing the symmetry restrictions.
4.2 MODEL REVIEW
This section introduces the oligopoly model of Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) that
investigates evolution of an industry with heterogeneous firms under a competitive dynamic
discrete-time infinite horizon setting. There are two groups of firms: incumbent firms and
potential entrants. In each period, every incumbent firm has to decide whether to remain
in or leave the industry. If it chooses to remain, it must decide how much to invest in this
period. A potential entrant has to decide whether to enter the industry or not. If it chooses
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to enter the industry, it must decide how much to invest. When these decisions are made,
product market competition occurs and each firm accrues an immediate profit in this period.
Next, the industry moves into a new state according to a Markovian transition, and so on.
We formalize the evolution of the industry in the following.
States and firms. Let N and N e denote the sets of incumbent and entrant firms,
respectively. Let N denote the total number of firms, which is fixed. Firm n is described by
its state ωn ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}. States 1, . . . ,M describe the product quality of a firm that is
active in the product market, i.e., an incumbent firm, while state 0 identifies a firm as being
inactive, i.e., a potential entrant. When incumbent (potential entrant) firm n decides to exit
(enter), its state in the next period will be ωn = 0 (ωn ̸= 0). The vector of firms’ states is
ω = (ω1, . . . , ωN), which characterizes the industry at any point. Ω is the set of all possible
states.
Let N∗ be the number of incumbent firms (i.e., active firms), so that there are N −N∗
potential entrants (i.e., inactive firms). In other words, the number of incumbent firms and
the number of potential entrants may vary from period to period, but the total number of
incumbent and potential entrants is fixed. Thus, once an incumbent firm exits the industry,
a potential entrant automatically takes its slot in the competition and has to decide whether
to enter the industry. Potential entrants are drawn from a large pool. They are short-lived
and base their entry decisions on the net present value of entering today; potential entrants
do not have the option of delaying entry, that is if a potential entrant does not enter in this
period, it perishes. In contrast, incumbent firms are long-lived and solve an infinite-horizon
maximization problems to reach their exit decisions. They discount future payoffs by a factor
of β.
Incumbent firms. Consider incumbent firm n, so that ωn ̸= 0. We assume that
at the beginning of each period each incumbent firm draws a random salvage value ϕn
from a distribution F (·) with E(ϕn) = ϕ. Salvage values are independently and identically
distributed across firms and periods. Incumbent firm n learns its salvage value ϕn prior to
deciding about its exit and investment, but the salvage values of its rivals remain unknown
to it. Let χn(ω, ϕn) = 1 indicate that the decision of incumbent firm n, who has drawn
salvage value ϕn, is to remain in the industry in state ω and let χn(ω, ϕn) = 0 indicate that
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its decision is to exit the industry, collect the salvage value ϕn, and perish. Since this decision
is conditioned on its private ϕn, it is a random variable from the perspective of other firms.
We use ξn(ω) =
∫
χn(ω, ϕn)dF (ϕn) to denote the probability that incumbent firm n remains
in the industry in state ω.
If an incumbent firm n remains in the industry at state ω, it competes in the product
market, and accrues a current profit of πn(ω). In addition to receiving the current profit,
the incumbent incurs the investment xn(ω) ∈ [0, x] that it decided on at the beginning
of the period and moves from state ωn to state ω
′
n ̸= 0 in accordance with the transition
probabilities specified subsequently.
Potential entrants. Suppose that ωn = 0 and consider potential entrant n. We assume
that at the beginning of each period each potential entrant draws a random setup cost ϕen from
a distribution F e(·) with E(ϕen) = ϕe. Like salvage values, setup costs are independently and
identically distributed across firms and periods, and setup cost of a firm is private information
of the firm. If potential entrant n enters the industry, it incurs the setup cost ϕen. If it stays
out, it receives nothing and perishes. We use χen(ω, ϕ
e
n) = 1 to indicate that the decision of
potential entrant n, who has drawn setup cost ϕen, is to enter the industry in state ω and
χen(ω, ϕ
e






e(ϕn) denotes the probability that potential entrant n enters
the industry in state ω.
Unlike an incumbent, the entrant does not compete in the product market. Instead it
undergoes a setup period upon committing to entry. The entrant incurs its previously chosen
investment xen ∈ [0, xe] and moves to state w′n ̸= 0. Hence, at the end of the setup period,
the entrant becomes an incumbent.
Transition probabilities. The probability that the industry transitions from today’s
state ω to tomorrow’s state ω′ is determined jointly by the investment decisions of the incum-
bent firms that remain in the industry and the potential entrants that enter the industry.
Thus, P (ω′ | ω, χ(ω, ϕ), χe(ω, ϕe), x(ω), xe(ω)) is the probability that the industry moves
from state ω to state ω′ given that the incumbent firms’ exit decision are χ(ω, ϕ), their
investment decisions are x(ω), etc.
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We denote a strategy profile by (x, ξ), that specifies decisions of all players for all states.
Following the notation convention, (x−n, ξ−n) denotes strategies of all players except for n.
Proposition 12. Given a strategy profile (x, ξ) with associated payoff profile V x,ξ, the fol-
lowing hold:












ϕn ∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N ,
(4.1a)
V x,ξn (ω) =E{V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)} ∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N ,
(4.1b)













∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N e,
(4.1c)
V x,ξn (ω) =E{V x,ξn (ω, ϕen)} ∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N e.
(4.1d)




ω, χn(ω, ϕn), xn(ω), Vn
)
:=πn(ω) + χn(ω, ϕn)
(
− xn(ω)+














− ϕn − xn(ω)+
βE {Vn(ω′)|ω, ξ−n(ω), x(ω)}
)
∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N e.
(4.2b)
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Proposition 13. (x, ξ) is an equilibrium if and only if










∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N , (4.3a)
V x,ξn (ω) = E{V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)} ∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N , (4.3b)














∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N e, (4.3c)
V x,ξn (ω) = E{V x,ξn (ω, ϕen)} ∀ω ∈ Ω, n ∈ N e. (4.3d)
Propositions 12− 13 are standard results in stochastic games. For further discussion on
these results, see Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010).
4.3 CHARACTERIZATION OF ENTRY AND EXIT IN STATIONARY
EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we provide several characterizations of stationary equilibrium behavior of
firms for the model of Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010). Specifically, our first character-
ization presents a set of strategy profiles for which the payoff of a specific player dominates,
or is dominated by, that of a given strategy profile. The second characterization provides
a set of states in which the Bellman-Shapley equation is violated. The third characteriza-
tion yields a set of non-equilibrium strategy profiles in a “neighborhood” of a given strategy
profile. These properties are expected to facilitate the process of computing stationary equi-
libria. In what follows, unless otherwise stated, we use the terms strategy and equilibrium
to refer to stationary strategy and stationary equilibrium, respectively.
For each strategy profile (x, ξ), define





∀ω ∈ Ω, if n ∈ N , (4.4a)





∀ω ∈ Ω, if n ∈ N e. (4.4b)
For an incumbent firm n, Cn(ω, x, ξ) represents the expected discounted profit if it decides
to stay in the market in this period while the other firms always follow the strategies induced
76
by (x, ξ), and firm n follows the strategy induced by (x, ξ) from the next period on. For an
entrant firm n, Cn(ω, x, ξ) represents the maximum expected discounted profit if it enters
the market in this period without paying a setup cost while the other firms always follow the
strategies induced by (x, ξ) and firm n follows the strategy induced by (x, ξ), from the next
period on. For a ∈ [0, 1], the generalized inverse distribution functions F−1(a) and F e−1(a)
are as follows:
F−1(a) := inf{y ∈ R|F (y) ≥ a},
F e−1(a) := inf{y ∈ R|F e(y) ≥ a}.
For each strategy profile (x, ξ), let
Ωn(x, ξ) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | Cn(ω, x, ξ) > F−1(ξn(ω))
}
if n ∈ N , (4.5a)
Ωn(x, ξ) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | Cn(ω, x, ξ) ≤ F−1(ξn(ω))
}





ω ∈ Ω | Cen(ω, x, ξ) ≥ F e−1(ξn(ω))
}
if n ∈ N e, (4.5c)
Ωen(x, ξ) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | Cen(ω, x, ξ) < F e
−1(ξn(ω))
}
if n ∈ N e. (4.5d)
Proposition 14. Given a strategy profile (x̂, ξ̂) with associated payoff profile V x̂,ξ̂:
(i) For n ∈ N ∪ N e and a strategy profile (x, ξ) with associated payoff profile V x,ξ,
suppose that
ξ̂n(ω) ≤ ξn(ω) ≤ F (Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂)) if ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂), (4.6a)
F (Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂)) ≤ ξn(ω) ≤ ξ̂n(ω) if ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂), (4.6b)
ξ̂n(ω) ≤ ξn(ω) ≤ F e(Cen(ω, x̂, ξ̂)) if ω ∈ Ω
e
n(x̂, ξ̂), (4.6c)
F e(Cen(ω, x̂, ξ̂)) ≤ ξn(ω) ≤ ξ̂n(ω) if ω ∈ Ωen(x̂, ξ̂), (4.6d)
and











∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.7)
Then V x,ξn (ω) ≥ V x̂,ξ̂n (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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(ii) For n ∈ N ∪ N e and a strategy profile (x, ξ) with associated payoff profile V x,ξ,
suppose that
ξn(ω) ≤ ξ̂n(ω) if ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂), (4.8a)
ξ̂n(ω) ≤ ξn(ω) if ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂), (4.8b)
ξn(ω) ≤ ξ̂n(ω) if ω ∈ Ω
e
n(x̂, ξ̂), (4.8c)
ξ̂n(ω) ≤ ξn(ω) if ω ∈ Ωen(x̂, ξ̂), (4.8d)
and











∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.9)
Then V x,ξn (ω) ≤ V x̂,ξ̂n (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Note that payoffs of firm n under a given strategy profile may be calculated by value
iteration (Denardo 1967). Specifically, let [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
m and [V x,ξn (ω)]
m be the mth iteration
of the value iteration algorithm under strategy profile (x, ξ) where we initialize our value
iteration by payoffs of firm n under strategy profile (x̂, ξ̂).
(i) First, suppose that n ∈ N . From Proposition 12, there are following possible cases:
• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and ϕn < F−1(ξ̂n(ω)), then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = πn(ω) +
(



















= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
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• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and F−1(ξ̂n(ω)) ≤ ϕn < F−1(ξn(ω)), then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = πn(ω) +
(



















= Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂)
≥ F−1(ξn(ω))
≥ ϕn
= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and F−1(ξn(ω)) ≤ ϕn, then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = ϕn
= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and ϕn < F−1(ξn(ω)), then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = πn(ω) +
(



















= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
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• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and F−1(ξn(ω)) ≤ ϕn < F−1(ξ̂n(ω)), then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = ϕn
≥ F−1(ξn(ω))
≥ Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂)
= πn(ω) +
(





= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
• If ω ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂) and F−1(ξ̂n(ω)) ≤ ϕn, then
[V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
1 = ϕn
= V x̂,ξ̂n (ω, ϕn)
= [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]
0.
Our arguments show that if n ∈ N , then [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]1 ≥ [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Otherwise, if n ∈ N e, it can similarly be shown that [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]1 ≥ [V x,ξn (ω, ϕn)]0 for
all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 12 that [V x,ξn (ω)]1 ≥ [V x,ξn (ω)]0 for all
ω ∈ Ω. By the monotonicity of the dynamic programming operator induced by strategy
profile (x, ξ) for firm n (Blackwell 1965), it follows that [V x,ξn (ω)]
m+1 ≥ [V x,ξn (ω)]m for all
ω ∈ Ω. Consequently, V x,ξn (ω) = lim
m→+∞
[V x,ξn (ω)]
m ≥ [V x,ξn (ω)]0 = V x̂,ξ̂n (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) The proof is similar to part (i).
Proposition 15. (i) For a strategy profile (x, ξ), the Bellman-Shapley equation (4.3a) is
violated for an incumbent firm n ∈ N in state (ω, ϕn) if the following conditions hold:
F−1(ξn(ω)) ≤ ϕn < Cn(ω, x, ξ) if ω ∈ Ωn(x, ξ), (4.10a)
Cn(ω, x, ξ) < ϕn ≤ F−1(ξn(ω)) if ω ∈ Ωn(x, ξ). (4.10b)
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(ii) For a strategy profile (x, ξ), the Bellman-Shapley equation (4.3c) is violated for an
entrant firm n ∈ N e in state (ω, ϕn) if the following conditions hold:
F e−1(ξn(ω)) ≤ ϕn < Cen(ω, x, ξ) if ω ∈ Ω
e
n(x, ξ), (4.11a)
Cen(ω, x, ξ) < ϕn ≤ F e
−1(ξn(ω)) if ω ∈ Ωen(x, ξ). (4.11b)
Proof. (i) Note that when (ω, ϕn) satisfies the condition (4.10a), firm n decides to stay in
the market in state (ω, ϕn) under strategy profile (x, ξ) (i.e., χn(ω, ϕn) = 1). The payoff of
this decision is equal to Cn(ω, x, ξ) which is strictly smaller than that of deciding to leave
the market, ϕn. Hence, the Bellman-Shapley equation (4.3a) is violated in (ω, ϕn).
If (ω, ϕn) satisfies the condition (4.10b), then firm n decides to leave the market in state
(ω, ϕn) under strategy profile (x, ξ) (i.e., χn(ω, ϕn) = 0). The payoff of such a decision is ϕn
which is strictly smaller than that of deciding to stay in the market, Cn(ω, x, ξ). Therefore,
the Bellman-Shapley equation (4.3a) is violated in (ω, ϕn).
(ii) The proof is similar to part (i).
Proposition 16. Given a strategy profile (x̂, ξ̂):
(i) Suppose that there exist n ∈ N and ω̆ ∈ Ω for which F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) < Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂). Any
strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfying conditions (4.6a) − (4.7) and F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) ≤ F−1(ξn(ω̆)) <
Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) is not an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that there exist n ∈ N and ω̆ ∈ Ω for which Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) < F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)). Any
strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfying conditions (4.8a)− (4.9) is not an equilibrium.
(iii) Suppose that there exist n ∈ N e and ω̆ ∈ Ω for which F e−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) < Cen(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂).
Any strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfying conditions (4.6a)−(4.7) and F e−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) ≤ F e−1(ξn(ω̆)) <
Cen(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) is not an equilibrium.
(iv) Suppose that there exist n ∈ N e and ω̆ ∈ Ω for which Cen(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) < F e−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)).
Any strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfying conditions (4.8a)− (4.9) is not an equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Since strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfies conditions (4.6a)−(4.7), it follows from Propo-











∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.12)
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Inequalities (4.7) and (4.12) imply that:


















Therefore, Cn(ω, x, ξ) ≥ Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂) for all ω ∈ Ω. In particular, Cn(ω̆, x, ξ) ≥ Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂).
Thus, it follows that F−1(ξn(ω̆)) < Cn(ω̆, x, ξ) by the hypothesis that F
−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) ≤ F−1(ξn(ω̆)) <
Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂). By Proposition 15, the Bellman-Shapley equation (4.3a) is violated in state
(ω̆, ϕn) for all ϕn ∈ [F−1(ξn(ω̆)), Cn(ω̆, x, ξ)). This implies that strategy profile (x, ξ) is not
an equilibrium.
(ii) Since strategy profile (x, ξ) satisfies conditions (4.8a)−(4.9), it follows from Proposi-
tion 14 (ii) that V x,ξn (ω) ≤ V x̂,ξ̂n (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Hence, similar to the proof of part (i), it can
be shown that Cn(ω, x, ξ) ≤ Cn(ω, x̂, ξ̂) for all ω ∈ Ω. In particular, Cn(ω̆, x, ξ) ≤ Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂).
As (x, ξ) satisfies conditions (4.8a) − (4.9) and ω̆ ∈ Ωn(x̂, ξ̂), it follows that ξ̂n(ω̆) ≤ ξn(ω̆),
which in turn implies that F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) ≤ F−1(ξn(ω̆)). From the hypothesis that Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) <
F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)), it follows that Cn(ω, x, ξ) ≤ Cn(ω̆, x̂, ξ̂) < F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)) ≤ F−1(ξ̂n(ω̆)). As a re-
sult, strategy profile (x, ξ) is not an equilibrium since by Proposition 15, the Bellman-Shapley
equation (4.3a) is violated in state (ω̆, ϕn) for all ϕn ∈ (Cn(ω̆, x, ξ), F−1(ξn(ω̆))].
(iii) The proof is similar to part (i).
(iv) The proof is similar to part (ii).
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS
5.1 AN OPTIMAL INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT FOR A NATIONAL
KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAM
PKE is a growing clinical practice to provide transplantable kidneys for ESRD patients with
willing incompatible living-donors. Currently, the Netherlands and South Korea are conduct-
ing a national PKE program, and the United States is considering creating a national PKE
program since such a program will provide more and better transplants. In Chapter 2, we
investigated barriers to establish a national PKE program in the United States. Specifically,
we addressed how to incentivize transplant centers by a payment strategy to participate in a
national PKE program. We developed a principal-agent framework to model how a national
PKE program and transplant centers interact through the payment strategy. To find an
equilibrium payment strategy, we developed a bilevel program that can be solved through
a transformation into an MILP. We calibrated our model and provided several data-driven
insights regarding an equilibrium payment strategy and benefits of a national PKE program.
In particular, we demonstrated that there exists a “win-win” equilibrium payment strategy
under which all participants- consisting of patient-donor pairs, insurance companies, and
transplant centers- benefit from creation of a national PKE program.
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5.2 OPTIMIZING OVER PURE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA IN
CONSENSUS STOPPING GAMES
Stochastic games are a powerful tool to model competition of several players in a dynamic
setting. However, their applications have been limited since a stochastic game, in general,
possesses multiple stationary equilibria, and that makes it hard to predict how players be-
have. To solve this issue, it is inherently interesting to find a socially optimal stationary
equilibrium. However, the problem of finding a socially optimal stationary equilibrium is
often computationally intractable. We showed that such a problem is amenable to MILP
approaches for special cases. In Chapter 3, we considered consensus stopping games, a broad
class of stochastic stopping games. We studied the problem of finding a best pure stationary
equilibrium for this class of games, which we showed to be NP-hard. We presented an MILP
formulation for the problem of finding a best pure stationary equilibrium. We characterized
the pure stationary equilibria of the game, and developed several families of valid inequal-
ities. We developed an algorithm to solve the problem and demonstrated its efficiency by
our computational experiments. The majority of results in this chapter can be applied to
nonlinear objective functions of payoffs. In particular, the valid inequalities (3.7) and (3.8)
may be applied to any nondecreasing and general nonlinear objective function of payoffs,
respectively. The approach of this chapter might also be amenable to analyze stationary
equilibria of other types of stochastic games. We leave this extension as a topic for future
research.
5.3 CHARACTERIZING ENTRY AND EXIT FOR STATIONARY
EQUILIBRIA OF A DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY MODEL
Industrial organization is a field of economics to study how firms behave in an industry. Re-
cently, a class of stochastic games is adopted to model behaviors of firms in the literature of
industrial organization. Complicated structures of this class of stochastic games make it dif-
ficult to compute stationary equilibria. In Chapter 4, we investigated this class of stochastic
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games. To overcome challenges in computation of stationary equilibria, we developed sev-
eral characterizations of stationary equilibria. We expect these characterizations to facilitate
such computations. In fact, we anticipate that such characterizations may be adopted in a
framework similar to Chapter 3 to solve the problem of finding a best stationary equilibrium
for this class of stochastic games. We leave this direction for future research.
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